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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reiterating constitutional principles it has trumpeted since the mid-
1970s, the Supreme Court, in 2008, stated:  “capital punishment must be 
limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most 
deserving of execution.’”1  This constitutional proclamation provides 
assurance that only the “worst of the worst” will suffer an execution.2  
Fulfilling this promise, however, proves, at best, to be an elusive task.  
More than thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court handed 
down its pivotal decisions in Furman v. Georgia3 and Gregg v. 
Georgia.4  Over the course of this time, courts have struggled with the 
two related questions:  (1) who falls within the narrow category that may 
be slated for death, and (2) what characteristics constitute extreme 
culpability deserving of execution.  America’s obstinate adherence to the 
death penalty forces a confrontation with these questions as well as 
demanding an on-going review of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  Yet answering these questions is 
only the beginning.  Intimately entangled with the resolution of these 
issues is the dilemma of who decides and how the decision is made to 
protect some individuals from the executioner’s needle while 
condemning others to its lethal force. 
This article examines these issues in the context of an important 
and emerging constitutional challenge to the death penalty: whether the 
death penalty can be imposed on capital defendants who suffer from 
severe mental illness at the time of the commission of their crimes.5  The 
American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the 
 
 1. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 568 (2005), (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 2. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650. 
 3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 5. The offenders at issue in this article are individuals who would not meet the statutory 
definition of insanity so as to avoid criminal liability. 
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American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the 
Mentally Ill all endorse a death penalty exemption for the severely 
mentally ill.6  Recent law review articles7 suggest that such an 
exemption may even be compelled by the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Roper v. Simmons8 and Atkins v. Virginia.9  However, the jurisprudence 
of death and the process by which the Court makes these determinations 
is complicated, contradictory, and does not lend itself to easy analysis or 
solutions.  A realistic assessment of how the Supreme Court may 
consider the question of the Eighth Amendment’s protection for severely 
 
 6. Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 
30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Recommendation and 
Report].  See also Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities:  How We Can 
Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283 (2006) (discussing the then-
proposed ABA recommendation, reasons for the recommendation, and examples of executions of 
severely mentally ill capital offenders); Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposal on 
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (discussing background 
and development of task force and recommendation to provide death penalty exemptions based on 
mental illness or disability); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the 
Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005) 
(discussing recommendations and potential controversies of recommendations); John Parry, The 
Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities:  A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of 
Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 
667 (2005) (discussing the critical need filled by ABA recommendation). 
 7. See, e.g., Pam Wilkins, Rethinking Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment, 40 
U. MEM. L. REV. 423. (2009); Bruce Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence:  Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (arguing 
that the Court’s decisions in Atkins and Roper “set a new course” that should be extended to 
mentally ill offenders); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859 
(2009) (analyzing equal protection issues raised by Atkins and Roper, particularly with respect to 
other mentally disabled offenders); Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the 
Death Penalty, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1493 (2009) (arguing for extension of categorical death penalty 
exemptions to include mentally ill offenders); Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the 
Evolving Standards of Decency:  The Supreme Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUDIES 561 (2007) (contending Atkins and Roper signal change in scope of Eighth 
Amendment protection and arguing for inclusion of mentally ill within Eighth Amendment’s 
protection); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 
N.M. L REV. 293 (2003) (proposing an equal protection challenge particularly given the lack of 
state legislation creating a death penalty exemption for mentally ill offenders); see also Bethany 
Bryant, Comment, Expanding Atkins and Roper:  A Diagnostic Approach to Excluding the Death 
Penalty as a Punishment for Schizophrenic Offenders, 78 MISS. L.J. 905 (2009) (observing that 
while Atkins and Roper indicate greater Eighth Amendment protection, the legislative record at this 
time might not be adequate for the Supreme Court); Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death 
Penalty Near?  The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally 
Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (2007) (asserting death penalty exemption unlikely in 
near future). 
 8. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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mentally ill offenders forces an unmasking of the true workings of the 
modern death penalty. 
At the outset, this article briefly sets out the problem of mental 
illness among capital offenders and the death row population and 
reviews the characteristics of severe mental illnesses, such as 
schizophrenia, that plague some individuals who are sentenced to die.  In 
order to contextualize the severely mentally ill offender’s place within 
the United States’ modern death penalty structure, the article traces the 
constitutional development of our current capital punishment systems.  
This discussion considers how the Court crafts and justifies death 
penalty exemptions, examines how state legislative action plays a pivotal 
role in the development of these exemptions, and contemplates how an 
exemption for the severely mentally ill fits within this line of death 
penalty jurisprudence.  Because of the importance of state actions in the 
evolution of death penalty exemptions, the article presents current state 
legislative and judicial action with respect to a death penalty exemption 
for the severely mentally ill.  The article then confronts the constitutional 
challenges in the development of an Eighth Amendment exemption for 
the severely mentally ill offender and considers ways that might prove 
effective in creating an exemption, as well as the limitations of this 
process and the dilemmas it creates. 
II.  THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE SEVERELY 
MENTALLY ILL 
A significant number of America’s condemned prisoners suffer 
from serious mental illness, including reality-distorting disorders such as 
schizophrenia and psychosis.  Studies indicate that the number of 
severely mentally ill individuals on death row awaiting execution has 
risen steadily since the implementation of the modern death penalty 
system in the United States.10  By some estimates, 5% to 10% of 
condemned prisoners in the United States have been diagnosed with 
some form of serious mental illness.11  Given that there are roughly 3200 
 
 10. State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 106, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, 86 (Stratton, 
J., concurring) (stating “[o]ver the past 30 years, the number of people on death row with mental 
illness and other disabilities has steadily increased.  Although precise statistics are not available, it is 
estimated that five to ten percent of people on death row have a serious mental illness”); NAT’L 
MENTAL HEALTH ASSN, POSITION STATEMENT 54:  DEATH PENALTY & PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESSES (2010), http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54. 
 11. See Vidisha Barua, “Synthetic Sanity”:  A Way Around the Eighth Amendment?, 44 NO. 4 
CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (July-Aug. 2008); Henry F. Fradella, Competing Views on the Quagmire of 
Synthetically Restoring Competency to Be Executed, 41 NO. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 8 (Aug. 2005). 
4
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to 3300 prisoners facing execution in the United States,12 these estimates 
suggest that between 165 and 330 current death row prisoners suffer 
from serious mental illness.13  Thus, whether a state can constitutionally 
impose and carry out the death penalty on a severely mentally ill 
offender is an issue that could affect a significant number of current and 
future capital prisoners. 
The phrase “mental illness” covers a wide range of conditions and 
disabilities.  For the purpose of this discussion on establishing 
constitutional recognition of a death penalty exemption for the severely 
mentally ill, the article focuses on severe mental illnesses falling within 
Axis I of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).  This limited focus, however, may be too 
narrow, too simplistic, as it may fail to include capital defendants with 
severe brain injuries or similar impairments that raise concerns 
analogous to those individuals with an Axis I diagnosis.14  Nonetheless, 
this article relies on Axis I diagnoses because that is the classification 
used by the ABA in its recommendation to exclude the severely 
mentally ill offender from the death penalty.15 
DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses include severe clinical disorders such as 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders,16 which often reflect an 
individual’s real break with or disassociation from reality and rational 
thought processes.  Briefly defined, schizophrenia is “a disorder that 
lasts for at least 6 months and includes at least 1 month of active-phase 
symptoms (i.e., two [or more] of the following:  delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior, negative symptoms).”17  A psychotic disorder is a mental 
disorder involving the onset of “delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
 
 12. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Statistics reports that, as of July 2009, 
3279 prisoners await execution in the United States.  Criminal Justice Project, Death Row U.S.A., 
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2009), 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/DRUSASummer2009. pdf.  The American Civil Liberties 
Union estimates that since the mid-1970s, jurisdictions in the United States have executed more 
than sixty people suffering from mental retardation or mental illness.  See Lyn Entzeroth, The Death 
Penalty and Mental Illness, 20 AMICUS J. 41, 41 n.5 (2009) (citing Mental Illness and the Death 
Penalty in the United State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 2010 
http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/ 10617pub20050131.html). 
 13.  See Barua, supra note 11; Fradella, supra note 11. 
 14. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 
(4th ed. 2000) at 27-37 [hereinafter “DSM-IV”]. 
 15. See supra note 6, p. 531; infra pp. 559-60 (discussing ABA Recommendation to exclude 
severely mentally ill offenders from death penalty). 
 16. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 27-28. 
 17. Id. at 298. 
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speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence), or greatly 
disorganized or catatonic behavior.”18  Mental illness on this scale is 
truly debilitating. 
Severe mental disorders, such as schizophrenia and psychosis, 
present significant death penalty concerns.  Even though a person 
suffering from severe mental illness may be held criminally liable for his 
wrongful conduct, severe mental illness can often strip the individual of 
the degree of culpability and blameworthiness that the Constitution 
demands before a state can inflict the punishment of death.  If, as the 
Court insists,19 the death penalty is reserved for those whose conduct and 
mental state demonstrate “extreme culpability,” then how can the death 
penalty be imposed on someone who, at the time of the commission of 
his capital offense, suffered from delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
speech, grossly or greatly disorganized behavior, and/or incoherence?20  
Yet, to simply assume that the diminished culpability of the severely 
mentally ill offender will suffice to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to 
spare these individuals would ignore or at least underestimate the history 
of the modern death penalty and its evolution. 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 
Although many states and the federal government have carried out 
executions throughout American history and continue to do so today, 
capital punishment is not practiced in all American jurisdictions, nor is it 
imposed in all cases of capital murder.21  Even as early as the 1780s and 
1790s, Americans vigorously debated the death penalty,22 and prominent 
early Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson, advocated restricting the 
 
 18. Id. at 329. 
 19. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 20. As noted earlier, these characteristics are some of the characteristics set out in the DSM-
IV Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia and psychosis.  See supra, note 14-18 and accompanying text. 
 21. The first state to abolish executions was Michigan in 1846; the most recent state to abolish 
executions was New Mexico in 2009.  There are still two inmates on death row in New Mexico; 
however, the punishment is not available for future defendants.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ documents/FactSheet.pdf.  As of early 2010, 
fifteen states have abolished capital punishment.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.  Other states have legislation pending to 
abolish the death penalty.  See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity#2010. 
 22. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 88-111 (2002); John 
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision:  The Enlightenment, America's Death Penalty, and the 
Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 206-15 (2009). 
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death penalty to the most serious offenses.23  In the first half of the 
twentieth century, the death penalty fluctuated in its popularity and 
application, rising in use particularly in the 1930s,24 and declining during 
the 1950s and 1960s.25  By the late 1960s, executions had stopped, 
although many states and the federal government still had the death 
penalty “on the books.”26  During this period, a number of observers 
assumed that the death penalty in the United States would come to a 
quiet end as was happening in much of Western Europe.27 
A. Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia:  The Establishment of 
the Modern American Death Penalty Regime 
In 1972, as the death penalty appeared on the wane in the United 
States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Furman v. Georgia,28 to 
consider the Eighth Amendment implications of the death penalty.  A 
divided Supreme Court, in an unusually concise one-paragraph per 
curiam opinion,29 ruled that the death penalty system that existed in 
 
 23. Banner, supra note 22.  For a detailed discussion of the history of the death penalty in the 
United States and the abolitionist movements and efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-42 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring). 
 24. Banner, supra note 22; Furman, 408 U.S. at 334-42 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
 25. See AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY:  INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 
(John Yorke ed., 2009); Banner, supra note 22; LINDA CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, 
UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 43-44 (2d ed. 2008); VICTOR STREIB, DEATH 
PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 27-41 (2008); Furman, 408 U.S. at 334-42 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
 26. Banner, supra note 22; Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 25, at 43-44; Streib, supra note 
25, at 27-41. 
 27. Banner, supra note 22; Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 25, at 43-44; Streib, supra note 
25, at 27-41. 
 28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  The previous year, the Court rejected a broad constitutional 
challenge to the death penalty based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).  
 29. Although Furman voided all death sentences and death penalty statutes then in effect, the 
per curiam opinion is remarkably spare.  The per curiam opinion is set forth in its entirety below: 
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to 
death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp.1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969).  
225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969).  Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in 
Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp.1971) 
(effective prior to July 1, 1969).  225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969).  Petitioner in No. 
69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Vernon's 
Tex.Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961).  447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct.Crim.App.1969).  Certiorari was 
granted limited to the following question: ‘Does the imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty in (these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?’  403 U.S. 952, 91 S. Ct. 2287, 29 L.Ed.2d 863 
(1971).  The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in 
these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it 
7
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Georgia and Texas violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment.  Each justice wrote a separate opinion setting 
out his distinct views as to why the death penalty, as it existed in 1972 in 
the United States, was unconstitutional or—in the case of the four 
dissenters—why it was not unconstitutional.30  Although the Court did 
not find that the death penalty was a per se violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, the five justices making up the Furman majority concluded 
that the death penalty deprived defendants of their humanity under a 
random, arbitrary system31 that provided capital juries with virtually 
unrestricted discretion to sentence the defendant to either life or death.32  
 
leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further 
proceedings.  So ordered. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. 
 30. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall wrote opinions concurring in the 
judgment.  Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist issued dissenting 
opinions.  For discussion and excerpts of each justice’s opinion, see RANDALL COYNE & LYN 
ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT & THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148-54 (3d ed. 2006). 
 31. Justice Douglas stated that it would be “‘cruel and unusual’ to apply the death penalty—or 
any other penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, 
and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance 
general application of the same penalty across the board.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 244-45.  Justice 
Brennan observed, “The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human 
dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.  If there is a significantly 
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the 
punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.”  Id. at 279 (citation omitted).  Justice 
Stewart reflected: 
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree 
but in kind.  It is unique in its total irrevocability.  It is unique in its rejection of 
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.  And it is unique, 
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. 
Id. at 306.  Justice White opined that although the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional, 
given the infrequency with which the death penalty was being carried out in the early 1970s, the 
punishment had reached or was reaching the point where “its imposition would . . . be the pointless 
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public 
purposes.  A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel 
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 312-13.  After providing a 
detailed history of the death penalty, the constitutional development of the Eighth Amendment, and 
the retributive and deterrent value of the death penalty, Justice Marshall concluded that “the death 
penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 
358-59. 
 32. In describing the death penalty systems of the early 1970s, Justice Douglas stated: 
[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of 
judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should 
die or be imprisoned.  Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.  
People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 253.  Likewise, Justice Brennan commented: 
[O]ur procedures in death cases, rather than resulting in the selection of ‘extreme’ cases 
for this punishment, actually sanction an arbitrary selection.  For this Court has held that 
juries may, as they do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence wholly 
8
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Because of these defects, a majority of the Court held that the death 
sentences of William Henry Furman and the other petitioners violated 
the Eighth Amendment.33 
The effect of Furman was to render all death sentences across the 
country void and to render all death penalty systems in place at that time 
unsustainable from a constitutional standpoint.  Some contemporaneous 
commentators thought that Furman marked the demise of the death 
 
unguided by standards governing that decision.  In other words, our procedures are not 
constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the 
punishment of death. 
Id.. at 294-95 (citation omitted).  In an oft-quoted description of the death penalty system in place at 
the time the Court decided Furman, Justice Stewart stated: 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 
1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been 
imposed.  My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned 
for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally 
impermissible basis of race.  But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it 
to one side.  I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot 
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique 
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. 
Id. at 309-10 (citation and footnotes omitted).  Justice White offered this view: 
I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to 
the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases 
involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty.  That conclusion, as I have 
said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most 
atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. 
Id. at 313.  Justice Marshall also observed that “capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily 
against certain identifiable classes of people.”  Id. at 364.  Supporting this conclusion, Justice 
Marshall recounted: 
Regarding discrimination, it has been said that ‘(i)t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the 
underprivileged, the member of the minority group-the man who, because he is without 
means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial 
lamb . . . .’  Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray 
much of the discrimination.  A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of 
whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro.  Of the executions, 3,334 were for 
murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, 
including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape.  It is immediately 
apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their 
percentage of the population.  Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution 
among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial 
discrimination.  Racial or other discriminations should not be surprising. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-65 (footnotes omitted). 
 33. For further discussion on William Furman and his case, see Carol Steiker, Furman v. 
Georgia:  Not an End, But a Beginning, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES, 94, 127 (John H. Blume & 
Jordan Steiker eds., 2009). 
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penalty in the United States.34  Justices Douglas and Marshall expressed 
the hope that the opinion would signal the end of the death penalty in the 
United States,35 and Justice White stated that, in light of Furman, the 
death penalty “for all practical purposes had run its course.”36  Evidently, 
many state legislators did not share these sentiments, and at the state 
level, various groups began to advocate, reshape, and craft a death 
penalty system that addressed the objections expressed by the Furman 
majority.37  As a result, during the early 1970s, a number of states 
enacted revised death penalty laws, some of which were informed by a 
provision in the Model Penal Code put forth by the American Law 
Institute (ALI) during the early 1960s.38 
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the 
constitutionality of some of these revised death penalty statutes, 
selecting for review cases from five states:  Georgia,39 Florida,40 Texas,41 
Louisiana,42 and North Carolina.43  The Court found the death penalty 
systems in Georgia,44 Florida,45 and Texas46 to be constitutional, but held 
that the mandatory death penalty systems in Louisiana47 and North 
Carolina48 were unconstitutional.  In its plurality opinion in Gregg v. 
Georgia,49 the Court specifically found that the death penalty was not a 
per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.  In support of this 
conclusion, the Court first noted that not only was there a long common 
law history of the death penalty in the United States, but also after 
 
 34. For example, as the Washington Post “editorialized ‘We trust that the death chambers will 
now be dismantled.’”  Steiker, supra note 33, at 102. 
 35. Steiker, supra note 33, at 102-03. 
 36. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); Steiker, supra note 33, at 103. 
 37. For a discussion on the political backlash to the Furman decision, see Corrina Barrett 
Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 38. The American Law Institute has now abandoned its efforts to provide a model statute on 
capital punishment.  See infra p. 543. 
 39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 40. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 41. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 42. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 44. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. 
 45. Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242. 
 46. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262. 
 47. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325. 
 48. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280. 
 49. 428 U.S. 153.  Justice Stewart announced the plurality opinion in which he and Justices 
Powell and Stevens found the revised death penalty statute of Georgia to be constitutional.  Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.  Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented. See infra p. 542 (discussing Justice Stevens’ recent concurring 
opinion in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008)). 
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Furman, thirty-five states enacted revised death penalty statutes.  Yet, 
the Court insisted that history and practice alone were not sufficient to 
determine if the death penalty comported with Eighth Amendment 
guarantees.  Rather, the Gregg Court maintained that the ultimate 
question was whether the death penalty “comports with the basic 
concept of human decency at the core of the [Eighth] amendment.”50 
While acknowledging that the death penalty is unique in its severity 
and irrevocable nature, the Gregg Court nonetheless accepted the 
arguments that the death penalty serves the social goals of retribution 
and deterrence.  With respect to retribution, the plurality observed that 
while retribution may be an unappealing goal of punishment, it was not a 
forbidden legal objective and it was not inconsistent with the dignity of 
man.51  As to deterrence, the Gregg plurality found that even though the 
evidence was inconclusive as to whether the death penalty deterred 
future capital offenses, state legislatures were the proper governmental 
bodies to resolve this complex issue.52  The Court then concluded that to 
the extent that application of the death penalty in a particular case or 
under certain circumstances advances the legitimate social goals of 
retribution and deterrence, the Court was unwilling to say that the death 
penalty constituted a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.53 
The Court next turned to the revised death penalty statutes of 
Georgia, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina to determine 
whether the processes and systems established by these state legislatures 
comported with the Eighth Amendment.  As discussed above, in 
Furman, the justices found that unguided, uncontrolled jury discretion in 
imposing the death sentence was too arbitrary, too capricious, and too 
random to withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Louisiana and North 
Carolina responded to these constitutional concerns by creating a 
mandatory death penalty system—no discretion, no problem.  The Court 
rejected this approach, holding that although the death penalty schemes 
at issue in Furman were unconstitutional because they allowed too much 
discretion, the mandatory death penalty systems of Louisiana and North 
Carolina were unconstitutional because they permitted no discretion.54  
The Court found that the Eighth Amendment required capital juries to 
 
 50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. 
 51. Id. at 183-84. 
 52. Id. at 184-87.  The deterrence debate continues, although the weight of evidence shows a 
lack of deterrence.  See John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death 
Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009). 
 53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. 
 54.  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. 
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have some discretion to impose sentences less than death in capital 
cases.55  In contrast, the systems of Georgia, Florida, and Texas allowed 
varying degrees of jury discretion while providing statutory guidance to 
the jury as to what types of cases or what characteristics of the defendant 
might warrant the death penalty.56  The Court found that a guided 
decision-making process that still maintained some degree of jury 
discretion did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
These cases—Furman in 1972 and Gregg and the four companion 
cases in 1976—form the constitutional basis of the modern death penalty 
system in the United States.  In essence, a majority of the Court has 
concluded that to the extent the death penalty carries out the legitimate 
goals of retribution and deterrence it is not a per se violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.  Further, statutes that provide juries with criteria, 
like aggravating factors, to guide their sentencing decision, and allow the 
jury discretion, often based on mitigating factors, to impose a sentence 
less than death are generally going to be found constitutional.57 
In the thirty-plus years since the Supreme Court sanctioned the 
newest regime of death penalty statutes, American capital punishment 
has remained controversial and has come under withering criticism from 
both inside and outside the United States.  Some of the most damning 
critiques have come from past and present Supreme Court justices who 
ultimately concluded that the system is hopelessly flawed.  For example, 
Justice Harry Blackmun, who voted to sustain the death penalty during 
most of his judicial career, came to view the modern death penalty 
 
 55.  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. 
 56. Walker v. Georgia,129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (Stevens, J., statement on denial of certiorari) 
(discussing and criticizing the current perfunctory proportionality review of Georgia Supreme Court 
in death penalty cases); Bidish Sarma, Furman's Resurrection:  Proportionality Review and the 
Supreme Court's Second Chance to Fulfill Furman's Promise, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 
238.  For further discussions on the current status of the death penalty in Georgia and the extent to 
which the promises of Gregg have not been kept, see Therese Michelle Day, Death Penalty Law, 61 
MERCER L. REV. 99 (2009) (providing survey of Georgia death penalty cases from 2008-2009); 
Kristen Nugent, Proportionality and Prosecutorial Discretion:  Challenges to the Constitutionality 
of Georgia’s Death Penalty Laws and Procedures Amidst the Deficiencies of the State’s Mandatory 
Appellate Review Structure, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 175 (2009) (discussing current Georgia death 
penalty system and its shortcomings). 
 57. In addition to the constitutionally required narrowing requirements of modern death 
penalty statutes, the Supreme Court has continued to make clear that the capital defendant has the 
constitutional right to present broad mitigating evidence, and the state is obligated to make sure that 
the jury is able to fully consider and give effect to that evidence.  See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 
(2004); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (overturned 
on other grounds); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978). 
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system as constitutionally unworkable.58  In his dissent from the denial 
of certiorari review in Callins v. Collins,59 Justice Blackmun wrote: 
Our collective conscience will remain uneasy.  Twenty years have 
passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be 
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, see 
Furman v. Georgia, and, despite the effort of the States and courts to 
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting 
challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, 
discrimination, caprice, and mistake.  This is not to say that the 
problems with the death penalty today are identical to those that were 
present 20 years ago.  Rather, the problems that were pursued down 
one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have come to the 
surface somewhere else, just as virulent and pernicious as they were in 
their original form.  Experience has taught us that the constitutional 
goal of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the 
administration of death, can never be achieved without compromising 
an equally essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized 
sentencing.60 
Justice Scalia, who continues to ardently support the application of 
the death penalty by state and federal governments, has expressed 
tremendous frustration with the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.  
Writing in Walton v. Arizona,61 Justice Scalia stated: 
Pursuant to Furman, and in order “to achieve a more rational and 
equitable administration of the death penalty,” we require that States 
“channel the sentencer’s discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ 
that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance.’”  In the next breath, 
however, we say that “the State cannot channel the sentencer's 
discretion . . . to consider any relevant [mitigating] information offered 
by the defendant,” and that the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained 
discretion to decide whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the 
defendant or the crime indicate that he does not “deserve to be 
sentenced to death.”  The latter requirement quite obviously destroys 
whatever rationality and predictability the former requirement was 
designed to achieve.62 
 
 58. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent from denial of 
certiorari). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143-44 (Blackmun, J., dissent from denial of certiorari) (citations 
omitted). 
 61. 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (citations omitted) (overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002)).  
 62. Walton, 497 U.S at 664-65.  
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In stark contrast to Justice Blackmun’s solution, Justice Scalia’s 
resolution to the constitutional inconsistencies and internal 
incompatibility of the modern U.S. death penalty system is to eliminate 
the constitutional requirement of discretion and the broad presentation of 
mitigating evidence.63 
In Kansas v. Marsh,64 Justice Souter, in dissent, expressed concerns 
about the fairness and reliability of America’s death penalty system, 
particularly in light of the danger of executing an innocent person.  In 
this regard, Justice Souter opined: 
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in 
practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for 
the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts 
under death sentences, in numbers never imagined before the 
development of DNA tests.  We cannot face up to these facts and still 
hold that the guarantee of morally justifiable sentencing is hollow 
enough to allow maximizing death sentences, by requiring them when 
juries fail to find the worst degree of culpability:  when, by a State's 
own standards and a State's own characterization, the case for death is 
“doubtful.”65 
More recently, Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees,66 said in a 
concurring opinion that he had been persuaded that: 
Current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the United 
States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law 
are the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable 
deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of administering 
that penalty against its identifiable benefits, and rest in part on a faulty 
assumption about the retributive force of the death penalty.67 
 
 63. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-93(1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976), the Court specifically found that the Eighth Amendment’s evolving 
standards of decency prohibit mandatory death sentences.  The Woodson Court detailed the long 
repudiation of the mandatory death penalty by states and the federal government finding “[t]he 
consistent course charted by the state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past 
century demonstrates that the aversion of jurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by 
society at large.”  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295. 
 64.  548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
 65. Id. at 207-08.  For a chilling account of a case where an innocent man may have very well 
been executed, see David Grann, Trial by Fire, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42-52. 
 66. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 67. Id. at 1547. 
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It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens was one of the three justices 
who signed the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, in which the 
Court sanctioned the modern death penalty system.68 
The inherent constitutional flaws and significant practical problems 
presented in creating a workable and constitutional death penalty system 
were made plain in a recent resolution by the American Law Institute.  
On October 23, 2009, the ALI Council, with a few abstentions, adopted 
the following resolution, which had been approved by the ALI 
membership:  “For reasons stated in Part V of the Council’s report to the 
membership, the Institute withdraws Section 210.6 of the Model Penal 
Code in light of the current intractable institutional and structural 
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering 
capital punishment.”69  Thus, the ALI, whose Model Penal Code formed 
the intellectual framework for modern death penalty statutes, refuses to 
tinker any longer with the machinery of death.70 
B. Limitations on the Modern Death Penalty 
Despite the misgivings of various justices and prominent American 
legal organizations about the fairness and constitutional workability of 
the modern death penalty, there does not appear to be a majority on the 
current Supreme Court willing to find that the modern death penalty 
regime is unconstitutional—at least on a whole-scale level.71  Rather 
what has emerged since 1976 is the Court’s creation of discrete 
circumstances in which the Eighth Amendment restricts the reach of the 
death penalty. 
As the Court stated in Kennedy v. Louisiana,72 for the infliction of 
the death penalty to fall within the parameters of constitutional 
acceptability its imposition in a particular case or on a particular person 
must comport with the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
 
 68. See supra note 49. 
 69. Message From ALI Director Lance Liebman, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (2009), 
http://www.ali.org/ _news/10232009.htm.  See Report of the Council to the Membership of the 
American Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Apr. 15, 
2009), http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf. 
 70. See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating 
“[f]rom this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death”). 
 71. In contrast, Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded that the death penalty violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances and it therefore is a per se 
unconstitutional form of punishment.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229-31, 240-41 (1976) 
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
 72. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
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progress of a maturing society73 and must “be graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense.”74  In the majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy observed:  “When the law punishes by death, it risks its own 
sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional 
commitment to decency and restraint.”75  In keeping with this 
observation, Justice Kennedy stated: 
For these reasons we have explained that capital punishment must “be 
limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them “the most 
deserving of execution.”  Though the death penalty is not invariably 
unconstitutional, the Court insists upon confining the instances in 
which the punishment can be imposed.76 
Accordingly, the Court has found that there are certain groups of 
individuals upon whom or certain circumstances under which the death 
penalty may not be constitutionally imposed. 
For example, the Supreme Court recognized in Coker v. Georgia,77 
and more recently in Kennedy v. Louisiana,78 that in cases of crimes 
against the individual, the death penalty is an appropriate punishment 
only for the crime of capital murder.79  The Court has held that the death 
penalty is not an appropriate punishment for the crime of the rape,80 even 
 
 73. Id. at 2649.  A century ago, the Court described the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional 
device designed to restrain legislative “power [that] might be tempted to cruelty.”  Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).  The Weems Court specifically stated that the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment was not limited to punishments prohibited in England at the time of the Stuarts 
and noted that “a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which 
gave it birth.”  Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.  Approximately fifty years after Weems, the Court in Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (footnote omitted), set out the following oft-quoted 
description of the Eighth Amendment:  “the words of the Eighth Amendment are not precise, and 
that their scope is not static.  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Id. 
 74. For early cases developing the scope and meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, (1958), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 75. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650. 
 76. Id. at 2650. 
 77. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 78. 128 S. Ct. 2641. 
 79. The Kennedy Court stated: 
Our concern here is limited to crimes against individual persons.  We do not address, for 
example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin 
activity, which are offenses against the State.  As it relates to crimes against individuals, 
though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s life 
was not taken. 
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 80. Coker, 433 U.S. at 584. 
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the horrific rape of a young child.81  Moreover, even when a crime 
results in the death of the victim, the Court demands that the defendant 
have sufficient knowledge of and participation in the murder—that is, 
there must a sufficient degree of personal culpability before the State can 
constitutionally punish an individual by killing him.82  In determining 
that the Eighth Amendment imposes these limitations on the death 
penalty, the Court considers the history and standards of the Eighth 
Amendment and the evolution of the Eighth Amendment’s protection of 
the dignity of man.  Moreover, the Court looks, often as a first or critical 
step in its analysis, at whether state statutes provide for or prohibit the 
death penalty in a particular set of circumstances.  Arguably, the Court 
views state statutes as providing the objective standards and norms that 
create a consensus on the appropriateness of the imposition of the death 
penalty in a particular type of case or on a particular person.83 
In addition to these constitutional restrictions on the death penalty, 
the Court has found that there are certain groups or classes of persons on 
whom the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed.  For 
example, in Atkins v. Virginia,84 the Court held that the death penalty 
cannot be constitutionally imposed on someone who is mentally 
retarded, although the Court left it to the states to craft the actual 
standards and processes by which states determine whether a person is 
mentally retarded and therefore death penalty ineligible.85  Likewise, in 
Roper v. Simmons,86 the Court held that the death penalty cannot be 
constitutionally imposed on anyone who was under the age of eighteen 
 
 81. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641. 
 82. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (holding “reckless disregard for 
human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of 
death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in 
making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not 
inevitable, lethal result”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that imposing 
death penalty on defendant who aided and abetted in robbery, which resulted in two deaths, but who 
himself “did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing [the murders] does not 
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.  This 
is the judgment of most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we have no 
reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing and applying the Eighth 
Amendment”).  
 83. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315-18 (1989). 
 84. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 85. Id.  Of course crafting this criteria and process can result in some states under-protecting 
those with mental retardation and allows for a fair amount of discretion and variation in how this 
constitutional protection is implemented.  As discussed, infra, such inconsistent applications of 
Atkins’ standard arguably reflects the interplay of the democratic process and the scope of 
constitutional protection. 
 86. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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at the time of the commission of his capital offense.  As commentators 
have noted,87 these two cases provide powerful analogies to the position 
and status of the severely mentally ill offender. 
C. The Development of Eighth Amendment Protection for Mentally 
Retarded and Juvenile Offenders 
The constitutional exemptions established in Roper and Atkins 
tracked similar paths in their development.  First, both decisions 
overturned fairly recent Supreme Court precedent.  In 2005, Roper 
overturned Stanford v. Kentucky,88 a 1989 decision in which the Court 
found that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit states from executing 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.  In 2002, Atkins overturned Penry v. 
Lynaugh,89 a 1989 decision in which the Court found no constitutional 
violation in executing mentally retarded offenders. 
Second, prior to Atkins and Roper, a defendant’s youth or mental 
retardation was generally considered a mitigating factor that the 
defendant could present to persuade the jury to impose a punishment less 
than death.90  However, with respect to both a defendant’s status as 
either a youthful or mentally retarded offender, that status could serve as 
a double-edged sword.91  Both the Supreme Court and commentators 
researching the use of these potentially mitigating factors recognized 
that many jurors viewed these qualities as making the defendant more 
dangerous and deserving of death.92  Accordingly, there existed a danger 
that jurors would misinterpret the evidence of youth or limited 
intellectual capacity and use that evidence to punish the defendant in an 
inappropriately excessive manner. 
Third, there was strong social opposition to the execution of 
juveniles and mentally retarded offenders.  The ABA, professional 
 
 87. Id.  See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 7; Winick, supra note 7; Farahany, supra note 7; Batey, 
supra note 7; Ghoshray, supra note 7. 
 88. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 89. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 90. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (requiring state to give mitigating effect to 
defendant’s youth as a factor to impose sentence less than death); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 
(1989) (requiring state to give mitigating effect to a defendant’s mental retardation). 
 91. Deborah Denno, Testing Penry and its Progeny, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12, n.75 (1994) 
(discussing double-edge sword effect of youth and mental retardation). 
 92. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004) (discussing danger that mental 
limitations could be used as aggravating rather than mitigating evidence); J. Richard Broughton, Off 
the Rails on a Crazy Train?:  The Structural Consequences of Atkins and Modern Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 11 & n.56 (2004) (listing cases discussing double-edged 
sword effect); Denno, supra note 91; Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1151 (noting that in Tennard v. 
Dretke, the prosecutor advised jury that the defendant’s low IQ was evidence of dangerousness). 
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organizations, religious organizations, and international organizations 
representing the interests of juveniles93 and the mentally disabled94 
strongly advocated for the abolition of the death penalty for these 
groups.  Further, the Court recognized in Atkins that “within the world 
 
 93. For example, the following amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of a constitutional 
exemption for juvenile offenders:  Brief for A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399; Brief for President James 
Earl Carter et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 552 (2004) 
(No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446 (amicus curiae brief of Nobel Prize winners); Brief for American 
Psychological Ass’n and the Missouri Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447; Brief for 
Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448 (amicus curiae brief of former American diplomats); 
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636450; Brief for 
the Constitution Projects as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636451; Brief for the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 
1628522; Brief for American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549; Brief for National Legal Aid 
and Defender Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2004) (No. 033-633), 2004 WL 1633550; Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of 
England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1628523; Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 
2004 WL 1617400; Brief for Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1588549; 
Brief for European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1619203; Brief for Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 
1660637. 
 94. In Atkins v. Virginia, the following organizations moved to file an amicus curiae brief in 
support of a constitutional exemption for mentally retarded offenders:  American Association on 
Mental Retardation, the Arc of the United States, American Orthopsychiatric Association, 
Physicians for Human Rights, American Network of Community Options and Resources, Joseph P. 
Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National 
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, American Bar Association, American Civil 
Liberties Union, ACLU of North Carolina, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, American Jewish 
Committee, Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America, Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition, Inc., General Board of Church 
and Society and General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, General 
Synod of The United Church of Christ, Clifton Kirkpatrick, as Stated Clerk of the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Masjid Malcolm Shabazz, the Mennonite Central 
Committee U.S. Washington Office, Progressive Jewish Alliance, Unitarian Universalist 
Association, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (formerly known as the United States 
Catholic Conference), American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, former American diplomats, and the European Union.  
Joint Motion of All Amici in McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727, to Have Their McCarver 
Amicus Briefs Considered In This Case Supporting Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304 
(2001) (No. 00-8452), 2001 WL 1682012. 
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community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”95  In 
Roper, the Court noted that in 2005 only the United States and Somalia 
had failed to ratify treaties barring the execution of juveniles, and only 
seven countries—Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China—had executed a juvenile 
since 1990.96 
Fourth, in both Atkins and Roper, the Court found that 
characteristics inherent in these groups of individuals make the death 
penalty an excessive punishment when imposed on them.  Specifically, 
the Court found that the goals of retribution and deterrence did not 
justify the imposition of the death penalty on either young offenders or 
mentally retarded offenders given the offenders’ lower culpability and 
blameworthiness.  As the Atkins Court stated: 
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law’s requirements for 
criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit 
crimes.  Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, 
and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level 
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.  Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability 
and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded 
defendants.97 
With respect to retribution, the Atkins Court said that the severity of 
the punishment “necessarily depends on the culpability of the 
offender.”98  Due to the diminished intellectual abilities, as well as 
diminished reasoning and impulse control of those individuals with 
mental retardation, the Court found that their moral culpability is 
diminished, and the goal of retribution is not advanced to the degree 
demanded for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty.99 
With respect to deterrence, the Atkins Court found: 
It is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these 
defendants less morally culpable-for example, the diminished ability to 
understand and process information, to learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses-that also make it 
less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of 
 
 95. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, n.21. 
 96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576-77. 
 97. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07. 
 98. Id. at 319. 
 99. Id. 
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execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based 
upon that information.  Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from 
execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with respect 
to offenders who are not mentally retarded.  Such individuals are 
unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of 
execution.  Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably 
further the goal of deterrence.100 
Thus, the Court found that the execution of mentally retarded 
offenders did not advance either retribution or deterrence.101 
The Court applied similar reasoning with respect to juvenile 
offenders in Roper.  The Roper Court relied on scientific and 
sociological studies, which showed that, as a whole, persons under the 
age of eighteen have an undeveloped sense of responsibility and are 
more vulnerable to negative influence.102  Further, the Court found that 
an adolescent is more malleable and subject to change than an adult.103  
According to the Court, these factors render the juvenile offender less 
culpable and less likely to be fairly considered the worst of the worst.104  
Relying on reasoning similar to that employed in Atkins, the Roper 
Court found that the death penalty is less likely to be appropriate 
retribution for the act of a juvenile offender, and the death penalty is 
unlikely to deter juvenile behavior.105  Therefore, like in Atkins, the 
Roper Court found that the death penalty, when imposed on juveniles, 
did not adequately advance the goals of retribution or deterrence to 
warrant its imposition. 
The importance of a capital defendant’s mental state and the degree 
of culpability also serve to curb the imposition of the death penalty on 
individuals who play a fairly minor role in the commission of a murder.  
In Enmund v. Florida,106 the Court looked at the culpability of an 
offender who played a peripheral role in a crime resulting in a 
homicide.107  The Court found that the defendant’s limited role in the 
crime and limited culpability in the homicide were insufficient to 
support a death sentence.108  Even in Tison v. Arizona,109 where the 
 
 100. Id. at 320. 
 101. Id. at 321. 
 102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-69. 
 103. Id. at 570. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 570-74. 
 106. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 797-801. 
 109. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
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Court perversely sanctioned the death penalty on two young offenders 
who did not actually commit the murders for which they were sentenced 
to death, the Court nonetheless stated: 
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability 
required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant 
commits the crime.  Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea 
that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is 
the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be 
punished.110 
These cases suggest that culpability is the touchstone for the 
constitutional appropriateness of the death penalty.  Yet, the 
determination of culpability seems a bit like quicksilver, eluding a 
secure grasp.  For example, how does one explain the Court’s 1989 
conclusion that mentally retarded and juvenile offenders have sufficient 
culpability to be sentenced to death,111 while in 2002 and 2005, the 
Court found that these two same groups lack sufficient culpability?112  
The essential characteristics of these groups did not change in that short 
period of time.  The culpability of the mentally disabled or youthful 
offender was no different in the late 1980s than it was in the early 
twenty-first century.  Although the Court insists that the ultimate 
question in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is whether the Court 
finds that the penalty comports with basic standards of decency, 113 there 
is a fifth, and in my view perhaps dominant, reason for the Court’s 
change of heart in Atkins and Roper.  What really persuaded the Court to 
exempt the mentally retarded offender and youthful offender is that after 
1989, state by state, at a fairly steady pace, state legislatures were 
restricting the death penalty so that it could not be imposed on teenagers 
and mentally retarded defendants.  By the time the Court decided Atkins 
and Roper, at least eighteen death penalty states, many of which 
previously had allowed the execution of these individuals, now banned 
their executions.114  The Court found that these state statutory changes 
provided objective evidence of a national consensus that the execution of 
these individuals violates the Eighth Amendment.115 
 
 110. Id. at 156. 
 111. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361. 
 112. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 113. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.  The Court consistently maintains that the ultimate question of 
constitutionality rests with it; however, the pattern of recognition of death penalty exemption 
indicates that state action is often determinative, or at the very least, a critical first step. 
 114. See infra p. 551.   
 115. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17. 
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An examination of the Court’s 1988 decision in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma116 illustrates the Court’s focus on state legislative action and 
the inevitability that the Court will respond to or be limited by state 
legislative actions.  In Thompson, the Court found that the Eighth 
Amendment forbade the execution of a fifteen-year-old Oklahoma boy 
based in significant part on what states were legislatively providing.117  
The Thompson Court found: 
Most state legislatures have not expressly confronted the question of 
establishing a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty.  In 14 
States, capital punishment is not authorized at all, and in 19 others 
capital punishment is authorized but no minimum age is expressly 
stated in the death penalty statute.  One might argue on the basis of this 
body of legislation that there is no chronological age at which the  
imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional and that our current 
standards of decency would still tolerate the execution of 10-year-old 
children.  We think it self-evident that such an argument is 
unacceptable; indeed, no such argument has been advanced in this 
case.  If, therefore, we accept the  premise that some offenders are 
simply too young to be put to death, it is reasonable to put this group 
of statutes to one side because they do not focus on the question of 
where the chronological age line should be drawn.  When we confine 
our attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a 
minimum age in their death-penalty statutes, we find that all of them 
require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the 
time of the capital offense.118 
These eighteen death penalty states then provided an adequate 
consensus that the imposition of the death penalty on fifteen-year-olds 
violated the Eighth Amendment.119 
In contrast, in Stanford v. Kentucky,120 the Court found that fifteen 
death penalty states prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on 
sixteen-year-olds and twelve death penalty states prohibiting the 
imposition of the death penalty on seventeen-year-olds was not enough 
to show a national consensus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the 
execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.121  By 2005, 
eighteen death penalty states prohibited the imposition of the death 
 
 116. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-29. 
 119. Id. at 828-29. 
 120. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 5512 (2005). 
 121. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71. 
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penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and the Court found the 
necessary consensus to recognize a death penalty exemption for juvenile 
offenders. 
A similar study of state statutes emerges in the context of the 
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders.  In Penry 
v. Lynaugh,122 the Court found that there was no national consensus 
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded 
offenders because only one or two states and the federal government 
prohibited the execution of these offenders.  At the conclusion of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Penry, she stated, “While a national 
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday 
emerge reflecting the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,’ there is insufficient evidence of such a 
consensus today.”123  By 2002, when eighteen death penalty states 
prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded offender, the balance 
tipped in favor of protection.124 
D. The Process of Counting States to Find a National Consensus on 
the Meaning of the Eighth Amendment 
This “counting” of states to determine the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment occurs in other cases.  For example, in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana,125 the Court found it important that only six states allowed 
the death penalty for child rape, and only Louisiana had actually 
imposed that penalty for the crime.  The fact that only six states had 
statutes providing the death penalty for child rape demonstrated that 
there was a national consensus that the punishment was disproportionate 
and that it violated evolving standards of decency.126  Likewise, in Coker 
v. Georgia,127 the Court found that the evidence that only Georgia and 
two other states allowed the death penalty for rape was critical in 
showing a national consensus that the punishment was disproportionate 
for the crime.128  In Enmund v. Florida,129 the Court found that the fact 
 
 122. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 123. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S 302, 340 (1989). 
 124. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 125. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 126. Id. at 2653. 
 127. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 128. As the Coker Court stated, “[a]s advised by recent cases, we seek guidance in history and 
from the objective evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death 
as a penalty for rape of an adult woman.  At no time in the last 50 years have a majority of the 
States authorized death as a punishment for rape.  In 1925, 18 States, the District of Columbia, and 
the Federal Government authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult female.  By 1971 just 
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that only eight jurisdictions allowed capital punishment for offenders 
with minor roles in the homicide at issue demonstrated that the 
punishment violated evolving standards of decency.  In contrast, in Tison 
v. Arizona,130 the Court found that imposition of the death penalty was 
constitutionally tolerable where eleven states would impose the penalty 
in similar cases. 
Indeed, in the Court’s post-Furman cases, the Court often falls back 
on state legislative action to support its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Perhaps part of this course of action reflects the political 
backlash the Court experienced in response to Furman.131  The Court 
seemed to reveal as much in Coker v. Georgia, which was issued a year 
after Gregg v. Georgia.  The Coker Court stated: 
With their death penalty statutes for the most part invalidated, the 
States were faced with the choice of enacting modified capital 
punishment laws in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of Furman 
or of being satisfied with life imprisonment as the ultimate punishment 
for any offense.  Thirty-five States immediately reinstituted the death 
penalty for at least limited kinds of crime.  This public judgment as to 
the acceptability of capital punishment, evidenced by the immediate, 
post-Furman legislative reaction in a large majority of the States, 
heavily influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder in 
Gregg v. Georgia.132 
However, the Coker Court further noted: 
But if the “most marked indication of society's endorsement of the 
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman,” it 
should also be a telling datum that the public judgment with respect to 
rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that 
crime, has been dramatically different.  In reviving death penalty laws 
to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously 
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies.  
Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three 
provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised 
 
prior to the decision in Furman v. Georgia, that number had declined, but not substantially, to 16 
States plus the Federal Government.  Furman then invalidated most of the capital punishment 
statutes in this country, including the rape statutes, because, among other reasons, of the manner in 
which the death penalty was imposed and utilized under those laws.”  Id. at 593. 
 129. 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982). 
 130. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 131. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 17 (2009); Lain, 
supra note 37.  It is also worth keeping in mind that changes in the makeup of the Court’s justices 
can affect not only substantive interpretation of the law but also process determinations. 
 132. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-94. 
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statutes Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana.  In the latter two 
States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and 
those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts.  When 
Louisiana and North Carolina, responding to those decisions, again 
revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty 
for murder but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to 
our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes 
since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and 
North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 
1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included 
rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized 
punishment.133 
Thus, the counting of states and statutes appears to be intimately 
tied to the protection that the Eighth Amendment affords. 
In the context of protecting juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders, this number seems to be eighteen death penalty states, or 
thirty combined death penalty and non-death penalty states.134  Perhaps 
embarrassed by having a magic number of eighteen drive Eighth 
Amendment protection, the Atkins Court insisted that it was the pattern 
and trend of state exemptions that compelled its finding of constitutional 
protection for mentally retarded offenders.135  It is worth noting that in 
the years immediately prior to the 2002 Atkins decision, the number of 
states protecting the mentally retarded offender was increasing 
markedly.  With respect to juvenile offenders, the trend to craft 
legislative protection was slower and less dramatic; yet, eighteen death 
penalty states, or thirty combined death penalty and non-death penalty 
states, protecting youthful offenders proved sufficient to garner 
constitutional protection for this class of capital defendants. 
E. Eighth Amendment Protection for “Insane” Prisoners at the Time 
of Execution 
In addition to the Atkins and Roper restrictions on the death 
penalty, the Court recognizes that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
government from executing someone determined to be “insane” at the 
 
 133. Id. at 594-95. 
 134. Justice Scalia has indicated that in the process of discerning death penalty exemptions for 
classes of individuals, only the legislative exemptions of death penalty states should count.  He 
would not consider non-death penalty states in this calculation.  See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361, 371, n.2. 
 135. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. 
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time of his execution.  As the Court explained in Ford v. Wainwright,136 
the common law prohibition on the execution of the insane existed even 
before the ratification of the Eighth Amendment in 1791.  With respect 
to contemporary attitudes at the time of ratification, Blackstone viewed 
the execution of the insane as barbaric and “inhumane.”137  Similarly, Sir 
Edward Coke, described such executions as “a miserable spectacle, both 
against Law, and of extream inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no 
example to others.”138  Therefore, based on the “original” meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment, the execution of the insane is a cruel and unusual 
punishment.139 
Moreover, when the Court decided Ford in 1986, no state allowed 
the execution of a capital defendant who was deemed insane at the time 
of his execution.140  Thus, applying the legislative standards and norms 
of the late twentieth century, Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Ford 
concluded that the execution of the insane, which served no deterrent or 
retributive purpose,141 violated the evolving standards of decency of the 
Eighth Amendment.142  In 2007, in Panetti v. Quarterman,143 the Court 
reiterated that the execution of the insane is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment and clarified that a state cannot execute someone 
who is unable to rationally understand either the reason for or the reality 
of his execution.  Writing for the Panetti Court, Justice Kennedy 
expressed deep concern for condemned prisoners suffering from severe 
mental illnesses that produce psychosis or delusional thought patterns 
that deprive the prisoner of a rational understanding of his fate or the 
reason the State has imposed that fate.144 
IV.  CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE SEVERELY 
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 
It appears then from this line of death penalty cases that a majority 
of the Court abides a death penalty system that arguably guides juror 
 
 136. 477 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1986). 
 137. Id. at 406 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25); Lyn Entzeroth, The 
Illusion of Sanity:  The Constitutional and Moral Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in 
Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 644 (2009). 
 138. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).  See Entzeroth, 
supra note 137. 
 139. Entzeroth, supra note 137. 
 140. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408. 
 141. Id. at 407-08. 
 142. Id. at 408. 
 143. 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 144. Id. at 960, 962. 
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discretion to find a defendant eligible for the death penalty while 
allowing the capital jury sufficient discretion to give effect to mitigating 
evidence that would provide for a sentence other than death.145  
Nonetheless, the Court has concluded that the Eighth Amendment 
precludes a state from executing someone for a crime against an 
individual that does not result in death.146  Further, a state cannot execute 
an individual for a crime that results in death unless the defendant either 
has sufficient knowledge of or participation in the death of the victim.147  
Likewise, the government cannot execute someone who is mentally 
retarded;148 the government cannot execute someone who was under the 
age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime;149 and the 
government cannot execute someone who is insane at the time of his or 
her execution—that is, a person who lacks a rational understanding of 
reason for the execution or the reality of it.150 
These exclusions, however, do not adequately protect individuals 
who suffer from severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia or other 
psychotic or delusional disorders, even though, as Justice Kennedy 
observed in Panetti, these disorders can disable and deprive their victims 
of rational thought processes and control.151  In reality, the “insanity” 
exemption remains remarkably narrow, affording very little real 
protection for the severely mentally ill.  For example, when the Supreme 
Court remanded Ford and Panetti for further consideration, the lower 
federal courts determined that both Alvin Ford, the capital defendant in 
Ford v. Wainwright, and Scott Panetti, the capital defendant in Panetti v. 
Quarterman, were “sane,” despite the fact that both men had well-
documented histories of debilitating mental health illness.152 
 
 145. But see Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 146.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 147. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
 150. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (1989). 
 151. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960, 962. 
 152. In the remand of Scott Panetti’s case, the federal district court concluded that: 
Panetti is seriously mentally ill.  He has suffered from severe mental illness, aggravated 
by alcohol and substance abuse, since well before he murdered Joe and Amanda 
Alvarado.  He was under the influence of this severe mental illness when he killed the 
Alvarados as well as when he insisted on representing himself at trial. 
Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).  
The court further stated that while there is mixed evidence on the extent of malingering behaviors, 
“it is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these 
delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado.”  Id.  Nonetheless, 
the court concluded that Panetti had a rational understanding of the causal connection between his 
crime and his pending execution.  The court recognized that Panetti is a mentally ill, delusional man 
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Likewise, the exemption for mental retardation is generally not 
applicable in cases of mental illness.  In Atkins, the Court left it to the 
states to devise statutes that winnow out the mentally retarded offender 
from the punishment of death.153  Most states adopted standards similar 
to the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV for mental retardation, which 
sets an intelligence quotient, or IQ standard, as well as an onset age of 
eighteen for an individual to meet the diagnosis of mental retardation.154  
An individual suffering from mental illness does not necessarily have a 
low IQ, although it is certainly possible for a person to have both a low 
IQ and mental illness.  However, many individuals with severe mental 
illness fall outside the statutory mental retardation exemptions provided 
by states and the federal government. 
Consequently, although the Court has construed the Eighth 
Amendment to protect from execution teenagers, mentally retarded 
offenders, and persons deemed “insane” at the time of their execution, 
the Eighth Amendment currently does not protect all or even a 
substantial majority of severely mentally ill capital defendants.  Yet, 
such severely mentally ill prisoners, those suffering from psychosis or 
schizophrenia, possess many of the same attributes, including 
diminished culpability and blameworthiness, as others who have been 
 
and that Panetti “was mentally ill when he committed his crime and continues to be mentally ill 
today.”  Id. at *37.  Still, the district court determined that Panetti “has both a factual and rational 
understanding of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the 
two.  Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crimes, this record 
establishes it is Scott Panetti.”  Id.  
 153. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.   
 154. The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for mental retardation is set out below: 
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approximately 70 or 
below on an individually administered IQ test (for infants, a clinical judgment of 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning). 
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person’s 
effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural 
group) in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional 
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. 
C. The onset is before 18 years. 
DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 319.  For examples of state statutes exempting the mentally retarded 
offender from the death penalty and establishing criteria for that determination, see e.g. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-753 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN.  § 5-4-618 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (2010); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
19-2515A (2010); 725 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. § 5/114-1 (2010); IND. CODE  §§ 35-36-9-2 (2010), 35-
36-9-6 (2010);   KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 532.130 (2010), 532.140 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 
28-105.01 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10b (2010); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2010). 
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exempted from the death penalty.155  For example, schizophrenia is 
defined by the National Institute of Mental Health as “a chronic, severe, 
and disabling brain disorder.”156  Individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia suffer from hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders, 
movement disorders, with hearing voices being the most common 
hallucination.157  Moreover, cognitive symptoms that can accompany 
this disability include a “poor . . . ability to understand information and 
use it to make decisions,” “[t]rouble focusing or paying attention,” and 
“[p]roblems with . . . the ability to use information immediately after 
learning it.”158  Often individuals with schizophrenia display a lack of 
understanding of the consequence of their actions, particularly when the 
individual suffers from delusions or hallucinations,159 and a lack or 
limited control of impulses, which can arise from the limits the illness 
imposes on the individual’s ability to process and use information or to 
control behavior, particularly behavior resulting from delusions caused 
by their mental illness.160  These attributes are not unlike the limited 
judgment, reasoning and impulse control of mentally retarded and 
juvenile offenders.  Moreover, these qualities provide strong evidence of 
diminished culpability or blameworthiness, which should place those 
who suffer these illnesses outside the category of the worst of the worst. 
Further, the defendant who suffers from severe mental illness may 
be at greater risk of an unfair trial or inadequate defense.  For example, a 
jury may very well view the defendant’s mental illness as an aggravating 
factor, which could increase the risk that a jury would impose an 
excessive or inappropriate sentence.161  Likewise, a defendant who 
suffers from severe mental illness may lack or have a limited ability to 
assist in his defense, make rational legal decisions, or adequately advise 
his lawyer about meaningful defenses.162  Particularly during the capital 
sentencing phase of trial, a severely mentally ill defendant may be 
unable to meaningfully assist his lawyer in developing and presenting 
 
 155. For a discussion on potential equal protection challenges for severely mental ill offenders, 
see Farahany, supra note 7; Slobogin, supra note 7. 
 156. NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, Death Penalty & People with Mental Illnesses (2006), 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia/complete-index.shtml. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., Unjust Death Penalty, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090106/EDIT07/901060316. 
 162. Id.  For a discussion of Scott Panetti’s mental illness and its effect on his capital trial, see 
Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).   
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mitigating evidence to the jury.  These same concerns also plagued the 
sentencing process of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders. 
An additional concern surfaces when the state seeks to execute the 
severely mentally ill.  As discussed earlier, Ford and Panetti give 
constitutional effect to the long-standing common law prohibition of the 
execution of the insane.  This exemption, however, raises the specter of 
the government forcibly medicating the condemned prisoner with anti-
psychotic drugs to render the “insane” capital defendant “sane” enough 
to execute.  Because anti-psychotic drugs exist to treat mental illness 
such as schizophrenia, a defendant, who otherwise is exempt from 
execution under Ford and Panetti, may be forced to take medication for 
the sole purpose of rendering him ready for execution.163  Further adding 
to the moral dilemmas created by this macabre situation, a capital 
defendant may actually forgo medically appropriate and humane 
treatment for his mental illness to avoid execution.164 
As some commentators have observed,165 the parallels between the 
severely mentally ill and the individuals protected by Atkins and Roper 
are remarkable.  Like juvenile offenders and mentally retarded 
offenders, the severely mentally ill often lack or have diminished 
impulse control and have difficulty comprehending the consequences of 
their actions.  These limitations are due to the mental illness, particularly 
when that mental illness includes hallucinations or other delusions or 
thought distortions.  Like in Roper and Atkins, these characteristics 
diminish both the blameworthiness of the severely mentally ill offender 
and reduce the deterrence effect of the death penalty.  Also, like youth 
and mental retardation, while mental illness should be treated as a 
mitigating factor, it could easily be viewed as an aggravating factor 
instead. 
In response to these concerns, the ABA House of Delegates, in 
August of 2006, adopted a recommendation barring the imposition of the 
death penalty on persons with mental disabilities, including severe 
mental illness.166  The American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
also endorse this death penalty exemption.167  In accord with these 
 
 163. Entzeroth, supra note 137. 
 164. Id. 
 165.  Winick, supra note 7; Farahany, supra note 7; Batey, supra note 7; see also Bryant, supra 
note 7; Shin, supra note 7. 
 166. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6.  See also Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. 
Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 
(2007); Parry, supra note 6. 
 167. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6 
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views, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights also seeks an 
end to the imposition of the death penalty on individuals suffering from 
mental illness.168  Thus, as with juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders, leading national and international organizations support a 
death penalty exemption for the severely mentally ill. 
In the second paragraph, the ABA recommendation advises: 
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time 
of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that 
significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, 
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational 
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  A disorder manifested primarily by repeated 
criminal conduct or attributable solely to the acute effects of voluntary 
use of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a 
mental disorder or disability for purposes of this provision.169 
According to the ABA Recommendation and Report, this 
recommendation would “prohibit execution of persons with severe 
mental disabilities whose demonstrated impairments of mental and 
emotional functioning at the time of the offense would render a death 
sentence disproportionate to their culpability.”170  The ABA 
recommendation focuses on limiting the application of the death penalty 
to persons who possess a sufficient degree of blameworthiness for a 
constitutionally proportional imposition of the death penalty171 and is 
meant to apply the principles of Atkins v. Virginia172 and Roper v. 
Simmons173 to persons with severe mental illness, particularly persons 
suffering from DSM-IV-Tr. Axis I diagnoses, including schizophrenia 
and psychotic disorders.174 
Of course, an ABA recommendation is a far cry from a Supreme 
Court pronouncement banning the execution of the severely mentally 
 
 168. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, Death Penalty and Mental Illness (2010), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-mental-
illness/page.do?id=1101090; Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2003/67, The question of the death 
penalty, 58th Sess., Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (found in Compendium of 
United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, subsection 23, 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/compendium/compendium_2006_part_01_05.pdf); Comm’n 
on Human Rights Res. 2000/65, The question of the death penalty, 55th Sess., Apr. 26, 2000, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65; Entzeroth, supra note 12. 
 169. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6, at 668. 
 170. Id. at 670.  
 171. Id. 
 172. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded). 
 173. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution of juveniles). 
 174. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6, at 670.  
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ill.175  As noted earlier, several commentators have suggested that the 
decisions of Roper and Atkins compel a constitutional exemption for the 
severely mentally ill.176  Moreover, the unique characteristics of the 
mentally ill offender, the historic constitutional and common law 
exemption for “insane” offenders, and the risks of forced medication to 
render the mentally ill fit for execution present perhaps even stronger 
arguments that evolving standards of decency include protection of this 
group of individuals.  Yet, this observation is only part of the equation.  
Still remaining are the crucial questions of what state legislatures are 
doing on this issue and what effect state legislative action will have or 
should have in making a constitutional exemption for the severely 
mentally ill a reality. 
V.  BRINGING THE DEATH PENALTY EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY 
MENTALLY ILL TO REALITY 
As compelling as the analogies between the mentally ill offender 
and the offenders at issue in Atkins and Roper are, and as troubling and 
morally fraught as the execution of mentally ill defendants is, the 
Court’s record on crafting death penalty exemptions unfortunately 
suggests a continued tough road ahead.  Looking at Atkins and Roper, 
the tipping point in these cases was the fact that eighteen death penalty 
states, plus the then-twelve non-death penalty states, prohibited the 
execution of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders.  It was the 
legislative actions of the states that compelled the Court to conclude that 
there was a national consensus to ban the execution of mentally retarded 
and juvenile offenders.177 
 
 175. Indeed, in another context, Justice Alito has indicated how the Court might limit the 
impact of an ABA recommendation.  See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring).  In discussing ABA standards for counsel in capital mitigation investigation and the 
bearing of those standards in reviewing the constitutionality of counsel’s performance, Justice Alito 
said: 
The ABA is a venerable organization with a history of service to the bar, but it is, after 
all, a private group with limited membership.  The views of the association's members, 
not to mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 
2003 Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as a whole.  It 
is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work that a defense 
attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution, and I see no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged 
position in making that determination. 
Id. 
 176. Winick, supra note 7; Farahany, supra note 7; Batey, supra note 7. 
 177. But see Batey, supra note 7, at 1525-27 (2009) (arguing that legislative consensus may not 
be necessary in light of Atkins and Panetti); Winick, supra note 7. 
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More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
the Eighth Amendment erects a categorical prohibition on imposing life 
without parole on juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses, 
including juveniles as young as thirteen.178  During oral arguments in 
Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida, the justices asked a number 
of questions about how many states allowed such sentences and how 
many states imposed such sentences.179  In deciding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence without the 
possibility of parole, the Court considered state legislative action a 
critical component of its analysis.180  As it has indicated in cases such as 
Atkins and Roper, the Graham Court stated that the starting point for its 
Eighth Amendment analysis is objective evidence of national consensus, 
and “ ‘[t]he “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's 
legislatures.” ’ ”181 
The Court’s approach to construing the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment suggests strongly that, in crafting a death penalty exemption 
for the severely mentally ill, one must consider and take into account the 
process by which the Court crafts its exemption as well as the 
substantive merits of the case.  If “counting” is a process that matters to 
the Court,182 then we need to count.  As of February 2010, fifteen states 
prohibited the death penalty in all circumstances; therefore, since Roper 
and Atkins, there have been three additional states that prohibit 
executions.183  In 2003, then-Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted 
all death sentences in his state, and for a period of time there was a 
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois.184  Maryland, which had a 
commission study its system of capital punishment,185 recently enacted 
 
 178. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2009) (No. 08-
7621); Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 14-16, 20-23, 25-32, 49-50, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2059 (2009) (No. 08-7621); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, 23, 26-27, 343-35, 42, Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 180. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 181. Id. at 2023 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312). 
 182. See Hills, Jr., supra, note 131. 
 183. New Jersey, New Mexico and New York are the most recent states to abolish the death 
penalty.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010),  
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf 
 184. See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Empties Illinois Death Row, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003). 
 185. See MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Md. 2008), available at 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/ 
death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf. 
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significant restrictions on the imposition of the death penalty.186  
Legislation is pending in several states to abolish the death penalty.187  
Other states, such as New Hampshire, California, Tennessee, Nevada, 
and North Carolina, have created commissions to study the death 
penalty.188  Thus, countering a more than thirty-year trend of expanding 
and embracing capital punishment, states are moving away from or 
imposing greater restrictions on the use of the death penalty. 
As to exemptions for mentally ill offenders, all death penalty states 
forbid the execution of someone who is deemed “insane” at the time of 
his execution.189  As discussed earlier, these exemptions are 
constitutionally required and also trace their origin to a common law 
prohibition on such executions that existed at the time of the ratification 
of the Eighth Amendment.  Although these exemptions do not cover 
most severely mentally ill prisoners, the prohibition indicates the long-
standing societal revulsion at executing a severely mentally disabled 
individual.  However, these exemptions do not correlate with the 
defendant’s mental illness and culpability at the time of the commission 
of his crime; rather, the exemptions concern the offender’s mental health 
at the time of execution. 
 
 186. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW, § 2-202.  It is interesting that, in an effort to ensure greater 
accuracy and fewer wrongful convictions, Maryland Code, Criminal Law, § 2-202, requires “the 
State presents the court or jury with (i) biological evidence or DNA evidence that links the 
defendant to the act of murder; (ii) a video taped, voluntary interrogation and confession of the 
defendant to the murder; or (iii) a video recording that conclusively links the defendant to the 
murder.”  Also § 202(c), provides: “A defendant may not be sentenced to death, but shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole subject to the requirements of § 
2-203(1) of this subtitle or imprisonment for life, if the State relies solely on evidence provided by 
eyewitnesses.”  
 187. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent- 
legislative-activity#2010.  According to the Death Penalty Information Center, legislation is 
pending to abolish the death in Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Washington.  On February 
19, 2010, a bill to abolish the death penalty in Kansas lost by a tie vote, 20-20, in the state senate.  
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/. 
 188. See S. Res. 44, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (establishing California Commission 
of Fair Administration of Justice to study death penalty in California); A.C.R. 3, 71st Leg., 17th 
Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2001) (authorizing legislative commission to study death penalty); H.B. 520, 2009 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009) (establishing a commission to study death penalty in New Hampshire); 
H.B. 163, 1999 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999) (enacted) (assigning to Legislative Research 
Commission task of looking at imposition of death penalty on mentally retarded offenders and 
prohibiting death penalty obtained on basis of race); S.B. 1911, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Tenn. 2007) (enacted) (creating a committee to study administration of death penalty).  See also 
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity. 
 189. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 
(1986). 
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To date, Connecticut is the only death penalty state that explicitly 
bans the execution of someone who is mentally ill at the time of the 
commission of the offense.  The Connecticut statute on point provides: 
The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the 
jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as 
provided in subsection (e), that at the time of the offense (1) the 
defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2) the defendant 
was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3) 
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the 
defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the 
requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in 
either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the 
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 
53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the 
defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although 
not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5) the 
defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's 
conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the 
defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of 
causing, death to another person.190 
Several states, however, have legislation pending that would 
implement a death penalty exemption for severely mentally ill offenders.  
Indiana presents an interesting case study.  Indiana established a 
commission, known as the Bowser Commission, to look at the 
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally ill.  The Bowser 
Commission191 issued a report in November 2007 recommending the 
exemption of the severely mentally ill from the death penalty.  In accord 
with this recommendation, Indiana, Senate Bill No. 22, introduced on 
January 7, 2009, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on an 
individual judicially determined to have a severe mental illness.  The bill 
defines severe mental illness as one or more of the following mental 
disorders: schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, 
major depression, and delusional disorder.  In connection with this 
legislative development, there has been sympathetic media coverage of 
Joseph Corcoran, a paranoid schizophrenic, who a jury sentenced to 
 
 190. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2010). 
 191. FINAL REPORT OF THE BOWSER COMMISSION (Nov. 2007).  According to the Final 
Report, “the Bowser Commission was named in honor of the late Senator Anita Bowser.  Senator 
Bowser had a long-time interest in studying whether the death penalty was suitable in any case, but 
particularly in cases when the defendants were afflicted with either mental illness or mental 
retardation.”  Id. at 4. 
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death for the murder of his brother, his sister’s fiancé, and two other 
men.192  At this time, the Indiana bill exempting the severely mentally ill 
from the death penalty has been referred to the state Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary. 
North Carolina also has legislation pending that would seek to give 
effect to the ABA recommendation to prohibit the imposition of the 
death penalty on the severely mentally ill.193  The proposed legislation 
provides: “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no 
defendant who was under the influence of a severe mental disability at 
the time of the commission of the criminal offense shall be sentenced to 
death.”194  The North Carolina bill defines severe mental illness as: 
Any mental disability or defect that significantly impairs a person's 
capacity to do any of the following: (i) appreciate the nature, 
consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct in the criminal 
offense; (ii) exercise rational judgment in relation to the criminal 
offense; or (iii) conform the person's conduct to the requirements of the 
law in connection with the criminal offense.  A mental disability 
manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable 
solely to the acute effects of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing 
alone, constitute a severe mental disability for purposes of this 
section.195 
The Tennessee commission196 studying the death penalty had, 
among its tasks, the duty to determine “[w]hether the law provides 
adequate protection for specific vulnerable populations such as the 
mentally retarded . . . and the mentally ill; whether persons suffering 
from mental illness constitute a disproportionate number of those on 
death row and what criteria should be used in judging the level of mental 
illness involved; and whether or not people with mental illness should be 
 
 192. Unjust Death Penalty, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at  
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090106/EDIT07/901060316.  Mr. 
Corcoran’s case has been remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court to the Seventh Circuit for further 
consideration of claims that the Seventh Circuit did not consider.  Included among these claims is 
Mr. Corcoran’s challenge to the imposition of the death penalty on one who is mentally ill.  
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8 (2009).  On remand, the Seventh Circuit vacated Mr. 
Corcoran’s death sentence based on unreasonable findings of fact by the Indiana Supreme Court.  
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2010).  The Circuit Court did not reach Mr. 
Corcoran’s Eighth Amendment claim that the execution of the mentally ill is prohibited because Mr. 
Corcoran had not exhausted his state avenues for relief on this issue.  Id. at 555. 
 193. Capital Procedure/Severe Mental Disability, S.B. 309, Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009). 
 194. S.B. 309, Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009). 
 195. Id.  As of September 2010, the legislation in North Carolina is still pending. 
 196. For a discussion of the Tennessee Commission, see William Redick, Is Tennessee Going 
to Fix its Death Penalty?, 45-SEP TENN. B.J. 12 (Sept. 2009). 
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executed.”197  Pennsylvania has legislation pending to investigate the 
death penalty and to impose a moratorium on executions;198 the study 
would include an examination of the types of protection provided to 
vulnerable groups, including the mentally ill.199 
All death penalty states allow a defendant to present mitigating 
evidence of mental illness to the jury as a reason not to impose a 
sentence of death.200  States also recognize that mental illness can, under 
 
 197. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-209(c)(3) (2009). 
 198. S.B. 1110, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). 
 199. S.B. 1110 § 3(b)(7), Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). 
 200. For examples of statutory mitigating factors taking into account the offender’s mental 
state at the time of the commission of the crime, see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (2010) (“capital 
offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-751 (2010) (“defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to 
constitute a defense to prosecution”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (1987) (“capital murder was 
committed while the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “capital 
murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or 
her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of 
mental disease or defect”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2010) (“[w]hether or not the offense 
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance,” “[w]hether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as 
a result of mental disease or defect”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1302 (West 2009) 
(“defendant's capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the 
defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to 
constitute a defense to prosecution,” “emotional state of the defendant at the time the crime was 
committed”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2010) (not setting out specific statutory mitigating 
factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2010) 
(“capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her 
conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2010) & State Court Rules Unified Appeal Report of Trial Judge (not 
setting out specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence, 
including defendant’s mental state and ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2010) (not setting out specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing 
presentation of mitigating evidence); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (2010) (“murder was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution,” “defendant suffers from a reduced 
mental capacity”); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2010) (“defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed,” “defendant's capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements 
of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
21-4626 (2009) (“crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbances,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the 
defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired,” “[a]the time of the crime, the defendant was suffering from post-traumatic 
stress syndrome caused by violence or abuse by the victim”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 
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(LexisNexis 2010) (“capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance even though the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance is not sufficient to constitute a defense to the crime,” “[a]t the time of the capital 
offense, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness or retardation or intoxication even 
though the impairment of the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law is insufficient to constitute a defense to the 
crime”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 905.5 (2010) (“offense was committed while the offender was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “[a]t the time of the offense the 
capacity of the offender to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW, § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2010) (“murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements 
of law was substantially impaired due to emotional disturbance, mental disorder, or mental 
incapacity”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1972) (“offense was committed while the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2010) (“murder . . . committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law was substantially impaired”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (2010) (“offense was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or 
to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (2010) (“crime was committed while the offender was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “[a]t the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.035 
(LexisNexis 2010) (“murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2010) (“defendant's capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a 
defense to the charge,” “defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional 
disturbance”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000 (West 2010) (“capital felony was committed 
while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law was impaired”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2010) (“[w]hether, at the time of 
committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct 
to the requirements of the law”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.7 (2010) (not setting out specific 
statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); OR. REV. STAT. § 
163.150 (2009) (“extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting 
at the time the offense was committed”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (2010) (statutory 
mitigating factors include “ defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” and “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-3-20 (2009) (“murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or 
emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” “mentality of the 
defendant at the time of the crime”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (2010) (not setting out 
specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-204 (2010) (“murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
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certain circumstances, relieve the defendant of criminal liability 
altogether although the person may be committed to a mental health 
facility for an extended period. 
Although the Court in Roper and Atkins tended to focus on state 
legislative action, state court decisions and state court action interpreting 
state constitutional provisions also seem highly relevant to the evolution 
of standards of decency.  States can express policy and constitutional 
principles through judicial action and interpretation of state 
constitutional doctrine as well as through state legislative action.201  It is 
worth noting then that some state court judges have expressed significant 
doubts about the constitutionality of executing the severely mentally ill, 
although these views are expressed in dissenting or non-controlling 
opinions.202 
For example, in his dissent in Corcoran v. State,203 Justice Rucker 
of the Indiana Supreme Court expressed the view that a sentence of 
 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements 
of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which 
was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's 
judgment”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (2009) (jury “shall consider all evidence 
admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage, including evidence of the 
defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or 
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (LexisNexis 
2010) (“homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or 
emotional disturbance,” “at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a 
result of a mental condition”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2010) (“capital felony was committed 
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “at the 
time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly 
impaired”); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (2010) (“[w]hether the murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance,” “[w]hether, at the time of the 
murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to 
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of 
mental disease or defect”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2010) (“murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law was substantially impaired”). 
 201. For a discussion of the use of state constitutions to advance individual liberty and 
protection, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
 202. See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind.2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting); State v. 
Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 803 A.2d 1, 41 (2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring); State v. Scott, 92 Ohio St.3d 
1, 748 N.E.2d 11, 19-20 (2001) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 203. 774 N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ind.2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting).  See Jon Laramore, Indiana 
Constitutional Developments: Evolution on Individual Rights, 42 INDIANA L. REV. 909, 930-
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death for a person suffering from severe mental illness violates Article I, 
§ 18 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that “[c]ruel and 
unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.  All penalties shall be 
proportioned to the nature of the offense.”  In Overstreet v. State,204 
Justice Rucker noted that “a state is free as a matter of its own 
constitutional law to confer rights above the floor of constitutional 
safeguards found in the United States Constitution,”205 and stated his 
belief that the Indiana Constitution provides greater protection than the 
federal constitution.206  Justice Rucker then opined: 
In this case, precedent from the United States Supreme Court, albeit in 
a slightly different context, informs my view on the question of 
whether certain mentally ill prisoners should be excluded from 
execution.  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that executions of the 
mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment.  Importantly the 
Court declared that the basis for this prohibition is the mentally 
retarded person's “diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others.”  Of course, Indiana's statutory 
prohibition on executing the mentally retarded predates Atkins by eight 
years.  And there is no claim in this case that Overstreet is mentally 
retarded.  But the logic and underlying rationale of Atkins applies with 
equal force here.  That is to say, if a person who is mentally ill suffers 
from the same “diminished capacities” as a person who is mentally 
retarded, then logic dictates it would be equally offensive to the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to execute that 
mentally ill person. 
. . . . 
Punishment is cruel and unusual under Article I, Section 16 if it 
“makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, 
but rather constitutes only purposeless and needless imposition of pain 
and suffering.”  Because I see no principled distinction between the 
diminished capacities exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished 
capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution, I would 
declare that executing Overstreet constitutes purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel and 
 
31(2009) (discussing Overstreet and Justice Rucker's separate views with respect to mentally ill 
capital offenders). 
 204. 877 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007). 
 205. Id. at 175 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v. 
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). 
 206. Overstreet, 877 N.E.2d at 175. 
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Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution.  Therefore, 
I would remand this cause to the post-conviction court with 
instructions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole.207 
It is interesting that Justice Boehm, another Indiana justice, 
observed in his dissent in Baird v. State208 that, with respect to Ford 
hearings and determinations of insanity, courts need “to exercise 
extreme caution in executing a person whose mental health is plainly 
questionable unless we can be certain the person does not meet the Ford 
standard, much less another more restrictive standard that may now 
apply in light of Atkins and Roper.”209  Justice Boehm emphasized the 
difficulties in making a Ford determination, particularly given Atkins’ 
attention to “the longstanding doctrine that the severity of the 
punishment must be correlated to the culpability of the defendant.”210 
In his dissenting opinion in State v. Scott, Supreme Court of Ohio 
Justice Pfeiffer stated:  “[t]his court could declare that in the interests of 
protecting human dignity, Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
prohibits the execution of a convict with a severe mental illness.  I 
believe that the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of’ Ohio call for such a judicial declaration.” 211  Similarly, in her 
concurring opinion in State v. Ketterer,212 Ohio Supreme Court Justice 
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton stated that courts should reconsider the 
imposition of the death penalty on someone suffering from severe 
mental illness, particularly in light of polls showing diminished public 
support for the execution of mentally ill prisoners,213 and the ABA 
recommendation to exempt the mentally ill.214  While expressing her 
personal view “that the time has come for our society to add persons 
with severe mental illness to the category of those excluded from 
application of the death penalty, I believe that the line should be drawn 
by the General Assembly, not by a court.”215  Justice Stratton then stated 
 
 207. Id. at 175 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 208. 833 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 2005). 
 209. Id. at 35 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. 
 211. 92 Ohio St.3d 1, 748 N.E.2d 11, 20 (2001). 
 212. 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, at ¶¶224-50 (Stratton, J., 
concurring). 
 213. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d at ¶232 (citing Kevin Drew, Arkansas Prepares to Execute 
Mentally Ill Inmate, CNN.COM, Jan. 5, 2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/05/singleton.death.row/ index.html). 
 214. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d at ¶¶233-36. 
 215. Id. at ¶248. 
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that she would “urge our General Assembly to consider legislation 
setting the criteria for determining when a person with a severe mental 
illness should be excluded from the penalty of death.”216 
Despite the views of individual state court justices, no state court 
has extended the Atkins and Roper rationale to severe mental illness.  
Indeed, a substantial number of state courts have expressly refused to 
extend these constitutional principles to mental illness and continue to 
find that the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill offender is 
constitutional.  For example, in State v. Hancock,217 the Ohio Supreme 
Court observed that no court had extended Atkins to mental illness and it 
specifically refused to do so, rejecting the claim that mental illness is 
comparable in terms of blameworthiness to mental retardation.  In Reese 
v. State,218 the Florida Supreme Court declined to equate mental illness 
or severe emotional disturbance at time of the offense with mental 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, at ¶¶156-158; see also State v. 
Lawson, slip copy, 2008 WL 4964319, *8 (Ohio App. 12 Dist., Nov. 24, 2008); State v. Johnson, 
207 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Mo. 2006) (refusing to find death penalty disproportionate when imposed on 
an individual with mental illness and declining to extend Atkins to capital defendants with mental 
illness); Johnson v. Com., No. 2006-SC-000548-MR, 2008 WL 4270731, *6 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2008) 
(unpublished) (finding defendant “has made absolutely no showing that a national consensus in this 
country, with a consistency of the direction of change against such executions, has arisen against 
executions of those with mental illness. Johnson's mental illness has not been demonstrated to be a 
reason to prohibit his execution”); Sprouse v. State, No. AP-74933, 2007 WL 283152, *8 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to extend Atkins to mental illness). 
 218. 14 So.3d 913, 920 (Fla. 2009); see also Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2009) 
(reaffirming no constitutional death penalty exemption based on mental illness at time of offense); 
Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 300, n.9 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting assertion that Equal Protection 
Clause requires an extension of Atkins to include mental illness); Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136, 
1151 (Fla. 2006) (finding “neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental illness 
as a per se bar to execution”).  In Carroll v. Crosby, No. 6:05-cv-857-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL 
2557555, *18-19 (M.D.Fla. June 20, 2008) (unpublished), the federal district court for the Middle 
District of Florida stated: 
Despite persuasive arguments and strong expert opinions in support of its application, 
the extension of Atkins to the mentally ill could prove to be difficult to implement.  
Unlike mental retardation, mental illness is not as “technically” defined and 
“scientifically” diagnosed.  It is a broad and ambiguous term that can encompass a wide 
array of mental disorders.  Thus, it could be difficult to know where to draw the line.  
Furthermore, there is no consensus in state legislation supporting a categorical exclusion 
for the mentally ill.  Perhaps someday, law and medical science will develop to a point 
where mental illness is recognized as providing an exemption from the death penalty.  
But that is not the state of the law at this time, and Atkins cannot be read to support 
Petitioner's position.  Accordingly, since the Florida court's decision was reasonable in 
light of federal law, Petitioner's claim must be denied. 
Id. at *18-19. 
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retardation or to extend Atkins to mental illness.  In Lewis v. State,219 the 
Georgia Supreme Court declined to extend Atkins to mental illness and 
found no support for the claim that the execution of severely mentally ill 
prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment.  In Commonwealth v. 
Baumhammers,220 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to craft a 
severe mental illness exemption in light of Atkins.  Likewise, lower 
federal courts in habeas review have declined to extend Atkins and 
Roper to severely mentally ill capital defendants.221 
Even though no state court has found a blanket exemption for the 
severely mentally ill, state courts often find that a defendant’s mental 
illness may warrant a finding that the death penalty is disproportionate 
as applied in a particular case.  For example, in State v. Thompson,222 the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found the death penalty a 
disproportionate punishment where the defendant, who had murdered his 
wife, had a lengthy and well-documented history of mental illness 
throughout his adult life and no significant criminal history.  In Haynes 
v. State,223 the Nevada Supreme Court found the death penalty 
disproportionate when imposed on a mentally ill man who was likely 
delusional at the time he committed the murder for which he had been 
sentenced to death.  In Cooper v. State,224 the Florida Supreme Court 
 
 219. 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778, 786 (2005).  See also Hall v. Brannan, 284 Ga. 716, 670 
S.E.2d 87, 96-97 (2008) (“as an independent, alternative holding, we conclude that, unlike the case 
of juvenile offenders and mentally retarded persons, there is no consensus discernible in the nation 
or in Georgia sufficient to show that evolving standards of decency require a constitutional ban, 
under either the Constitution of the United States or under the Georgia Constitution, on executing 
all persons with mental illnesses, particularly persons who have shown only the sort of mental 
health evidence that Brannan has shown”). 
 220. 599 Pa. 1, 960 A.2d 59, 96-97 (2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 104 (2009). 
 221. In re Neville, 440 F.3d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that Atkins and Roper did not 
create a new rule of constitutional law protecting the severely mentally ill from the death penalty); 
Franklin v. Bradshaw, slip copy, 2009 WL 649581, *74 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished) 
(finding extending Atkins to severe mental illness is outside a federal court’s habeas authority); Alba 
v. Quarterman, 621 F.Supp. 2d 396, 430 (E.D.Tex. 2008) (finding state court refusal to extend 
Atkins to severe mental illness was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and 
also was consistent with 5th Circuit precedent); Green v. Quarterman, No. H-07-827, 2008 WL 
442356, *7 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 15, 2008) (finding that the federal court lacks authority in habeas review 
to extend Atkins to mental illness). 
 222. No. E2005-01790-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1217233, *36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 
2007) (unreported, currently on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court). 
 223. 103 Nev. 309, 739 P.2d 497, 503-04 (1987). 
 224. 739 So.2d 82, 86 (Fla. 1999).  See also Crook v. State, 908 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2005) (finding 
death penalty disproportionate for twenty-year-old offender with mental deficiencies including 
organic brain damage); Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999) (“The killing here appears to 
be similar to the killing that occurred in Livingston and to have resulted from impulsive actions of a 
man with a history of mental illness who was easily disturbed by outside forces.”); Offord v. State, 
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found the death sentence disproportionate in the case of an eighteen-
year-old man with no prior criminal record who had been diagnosed 
with brain damage, borderline mental retardation, and paranoid 
schizophrenia.  In State v. Roque,225 the Arizona Supreme Court found a 
death sentence disproportionate based on the defendant’s mental illness 
and low intellectual capacity. 
While the preceding cases and discussions suggest that the use of 
mental illness as a mitigating factor protects the mentally ill, in reality 
juries frequently impose death sentences on the severely mentally ill and 
appellate courts regularly uphold those sentences.  For example, in State 
v. Johnson,226 the Missouri Supreme Court refused to find the death 
penalty disproportionate when imposed on an individual with mental 
illness and specifically declined to extend Atkins to mentally ill capital 
defendants.  In Dennis v. State,227 the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
find the death penalty excessive in light of the deliberateness of the 
mentally ill defendant’s crime.  In Rodgers v. State,228 the Florida 
Supreme Court upheld a death sentence in a case where the defendant, 
who had an extensive history of mental illness, pleaded guilty, waived 
mitigation, and sought the death penalty.  The Florida court found the 
death penalty appropriate because the two aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors.  Likewise, the Arizona Supreme 
Court in State v. Boggs229 found that mitigating evidence of the 
defendant’s poor mental health and difficult upbringing did not warrant 
leniency given the lack of causal connection between the defendant’s 
poor mental health and his crime. 
So where does this leave the legislative and state judicial 
consideration of mental illness and the death penalty?  All states prohibit 
the execution of someone who is so mentally ill that he is deemed insane 
at the time of execution.  While this legislative status is relevant, it is not 
 
959 So.2d 187, 193 (Fla. 2007) (finding death sentence disproportionate where there was only one 
aggravating factor and defendant had lifelong, well-established history of severe mental illness). 
 225. 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368, 405-06 (2006). 
 226. 207 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Mo. 2006). 
 227. 13 P.2d 434, 440-42 (Nev. 2000). 
 228. 3 So.3d 1127 (Fla. 2009).  See also Gill v. State, 14 So.3d 946, 964-65 (Fla. 2009) (death 
penalty not disproportionate despite defendant’s history of mental health problems given 
“magnitude of [ ] aggravating factors”); Hauser v. State, 701 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1997) (finding death 
penalty not disproportionate where defendant pleaded guilty and asked lawyers not to present 
mitigating evidence where three aggravating factors outweighed mitigating evidence including long 
history of mental health problems); Davis v. State, 2 So.3d 952, 965-66 (Fla. 2008) (finding death 
sentence not disproportionate despite evidence of defendant’s brain damage and chronic mental 
illness). 
 229. 218 Ariz. 325, 185 P.3d 111, 130 (2008). 
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precisely on point, and it is unclear how far the Court would extend this 
analogy.  All states provide that mental illness can be introduced as 
mitigating evidence.230  However, in Penry and Stanford, the Court 
refused to find that the mitigating evidence of youth and mental 
retardation, in and of itself, amounted to a constitutional prohibition on 
execution due to these characteristics or conditions.  The ABA and other 
noteworthy professional organizations recommend a death penalty 
exemption for the mentally ill.231  Although relevant and important to the 
development of an exemption, an ABA recommendation is usually not 
considered persuasive, on its own, by the Supreme Court.  Some state 
appellate justices are raising significant state constitutional concerns 
about the imposition of the death penalty on the severely mentally ill, 
which may offer further evidence of a consensus prohibiting the 
execution of these individuals.  However, these views have not yet 
garnered a majority on any state court to protect the severely mentally ill 
on state constitutional grounds.232 
Unfortunately, the evidence that seemed of critical concern to the 
Court in Akins and Roper was that eighteen death penalty states 
expressly banned the execution of mentally retarded and juvenile 
offenders, respectively.  These eighteen states, plus the then-twelve non-
death penalty states, provided the Court with sufficient evidence to show 
a national consensus that the imposition of the death penalty violated the 
Eighth Amendment.  This number, eighteen death penalty states, is 
consistent with the Court’s requirement of state legislative consensus in 
Thompson and Stanford.  With respect to showing a national consensus 
to exempt the severely mentally ill, there are now three more non-death 
penalty states, but specific mental illness legislative exemptions in death 
penalty states do not look as significant as they did in Roper and Atkins.  
Only one state explicitly bans the execution of the mentally ill, although 
legislation is pending in other states.  The status of explicit legislative 
exemption is not comparable to the legislative statutes present in Roper 
or Atkins, which may prove a significant stumbling block in efforts to 
achieve a constitutional exemption. 
These observations are not meant to underplay the legislative, 
judicial, and social action being taken on behalf of the severely mentally 
ill in the death penalty context.  They show, however, that what seemed 
to drive the Court’s jurisprudence in Atkins and Roper was not, or at 
 
 230. See supra note 200. 
 231. See supra note 6 & pp. 558-60. 
 232. See supra pp. 468-73 
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least was not simply, the compelling arguments of culpability, 
retribution, and deterrence, which the Court stressed as the constitutional 
underpinnings of the death penalty.  Rather, a significant part of what 
drove the Court to change its earlier position with respect to mentally 
retarded and juvenile offenders was the emergence of eighteen death 
penalty states statutorily protecting these individuals.  To the extent that 
the Supreme Court is looking for state statutes explicitly prohibiting the 
death penalty on the severely mentally ill, there is not as direct or 
explicit legislative protection for the mentally ill as there was for 
mentally retarded offenders in 2002, or juvenile offenders in 2005.233  
The current status of state legislation is more analogous to Penry than 
Atkins.  As discussed earlier, the Court in Penry did not find the 
legislative record sufficient to show a consensus that there was an 
evolving standard of decency protecting mentally retarded offenders 
from the death penalty.234  Again, this observation is not intended to 
discount the powerful analogy between the defendants protected in 
Atkins and severely mentally ill defendants.235  Rather taken together 
these observations are intended as a frank assessment of the Court’s 
record of construing the Eighth Amendment and a realistic assessment of 
the task at hand in crafting an exemption for the severely mentally ill. 
The fact that few states provide explicit exemptions for the severely 
mentally ill means that advocates for these individuals must engage in 
the messy, slow process of state-by-state protection for this class of 
capital defendants.  Steps are underway in a few states, and these efforts 
need to continue and expand.  Advocates should also look at state 
constitutions for protection of the severely mentally ill and use state 
constitutions to seek state court protection for these offenders.  Based on 
the Court’s track record on crafting death penalty exemptions for classes 
of individuals, going back to state legislatures and enacting state 
legislative exemptions remains a critical step in building a national 
consensus to protect the severely mentally ill. 
The Supreme Court has not yet agreed to hear an exemption 
challenge for the seriously mentally ill.  On October 5, 2009, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Baumhammers v. 
Pennsylvania,236 which involved the petition of Richard Scott 
Baumhammers, a former lawyer suffering from a delusional disorder of 
 
 233. See supra pp. 561-63. 
 234. See supra pp. 551-62. 
 235. See supra pp. 555-61. 
 236. 130 S. Ct. 104 (2009). 
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persecutory or paranoid schizophrenia,237 who awaits execution in 
Pennsylvania.  In his certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Baumhammers argued, inter alia, that in light of Atkins, the imposition 
of the death penalty on someone suffering from mental illness violates 
the Eighth Amendment.238  The Court declined to address the issue or 
hear Baumhammers’ case.239 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
EVOLUTION:  REALISTIC ASSESSMENTS, PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS, 
AND MEANINGFUL METHODS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROMISE OF 
ATKINS, ROPER, AND PANETTI 
The Court’s decision to not hear Baumhammers leaves open the 
opportunity to build a better record in the state legislatures before the 
Court acts on this issue, which, given the Court’s approach to Eighth 
Amendment exemptions in other cases, appears a wise step to take in 
crafting a successful argument for the recognition of an exemption for 
the severely mentally ill.  As noted at the outset, for better or for worse, 
the dance of death penalty law is more than simply the substance or 
merits of the constitutional claim or argument.  Seeking constitutional 
protection from an inappropriate or unwarranted death sentence imposed 
on a mentally ill offender also requires advocates to consider and plan 
for arguments addressing how the Court discerns and develops its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The Eighth Amendment’s “evolving 
standard of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society” 
standard explicitly invites this element of process into the substantive 
discussion of the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.240  The 
Court’s recognition that the Eighth Amendment’s protection evolves and 
grows more protective as society moves to a more humane system of 
justice means that there must be some system, or process, or measure of 
this evolution.  Accordingly, the Court must have some method for 
seeing or determining how that evolution occurs. 
Counting state statutes stood front and center in both Atkins and 
Roper, and this counting is consistent with other post-Gregg death 
penalty decisions.  Recognizing this element of Eighth Amendment 
analysis is critical to providing a full-bodied, successful constitutional 
 
 237. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Baumhammers v. Pennsylvania, No. 08-1455 (May 25, 
2009), 2009 WL 1486859. 
 238. Id. at *27-33. 
 239. Baumhammers, 130 S. Ct. at 104. 
 240. Lain, supra note 37, at 10. 
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argument for severely mentally ill capital defendants.  In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind the relationship between the democratic 
process and the development of the Eighth Amendment as well as the 
Court’s concerns that its processes not step too far outside public 
sentiments.241  In discussing a process of constitutional construction that 
has been referred to as democratic constitutionalism,242 Professors 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel observe: 
The premise of democratic constitutionalism is that the authority of the 
Constitution depends on its democratic legitimacy, upon the 
Constitution's ability to inspire Americans to recognize it as their 
Constitution.  This belief is sustained by traditions of popular 
engagement that authorize citizens to make claims about the 
Constitution's meaning and to oppose their government—through 
constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil 
society—when they believe that it is not respecting the Constitution. 
Government officials, in turn, both resist and respond to these citizen 
claims.  These complex patterns of exchange have historically shaped 
the meaning of our Constitution.243 
While recognizing the special role of courts to declare and enforce 
rights and to constrain government, Professors Post and Siegel posit that 
“judicial authority to enforce the Constitution, like the authority of all 
government officials, ultimately depends on the confidence of citizens.  
If courts interpret the Constitution in terms that diverge from the deeply 
held convictions of the American people, Americans will find ways to 
communicate their objections and resist judicial judgments.”244  
Reflecting these concerns, commentators have observed that when the 
Court leaps out too far ahead of legislative actions or diverges too far 
from the practices of the democratic institutions, there is often a loud, 
public rebuke of the Court.245  Arguably, when the Court overturned all 
death penalty statutes in Furman, it suffered a public rebuke by the 
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 242. See GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH 
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HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).  See also Liu et al., supra note 242; Whitehead & 
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 244. Post & Siegel, supra note 243. 
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states that reworked and reestablished death penalty statutes.246  The 
death penalty regime set out in Gregg and its companion cases arguably 
fell more in line with state legislative action.247 
Taking into account these concerns, an argument can be made that 
courts should look to what is happening in the nation’s democratic 
institutions and let that guide the shape that the Constitution is to take in 
the future.248  In this way, it is arguably appropriate and even preferred 
to allow the process of protecting the severely mentally ill to work its 
way through state democratic systems just as the exemptions for the 
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders worked their way through the 
state legislative processes.  And indeed, this approach seems to be the 
post-Gregg model that the Court has relied upon in construing the scope 
of the Eighth Amendment’s protection in the area of capital 
punishment.249 
But when courts cleave too closely to states as a guide for the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the results may prove 
constitutionally unsatisfying and unworkable.  Consider Justice 
Blackmun who, after consistently voting to uphold capital punishment 
statutes during most of his career, despaired at the end over the 
constitutional inadequacies of the modern death penalty system.250  The 
 
 246. Hills, Jr., supra, note 131, at 22-24; Lain, supra, note 37, at 46-55. 
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 248. See Post & Siegel, supra note 243.  See also Liu et al., supra note 242. 
 249. Justice Souter in his dissent in District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. 
Osborne,  129 S. Ct. 2308, 2340 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting), noted this concern in the context of 
the development of substantive due process rights.  Justice Souter opined: 
As for determining the right moment for a court to decide whether substantive due 
process requires recognition of an individual right unsanctioned by tradition (or the 
invalidation of traditional law), I certainly agree with the Court that the beginning of 
wisdom is to go slow. Substantive due process expresses the conception that the liberty it 
protects is a freedom from arbitrary government action, from restraints lacking any 
reasonable justification, and a substantive due process claim requires attention to two 
closely related elements that call for great care on the part of a court.  It is crucial, first, 
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is arbitrary and outside the sphere of reasonable judgment.  And it is just as essential to 
recognize how much time society needs in order to work through a given issue before it 
makes sense to ask whether a law or practice on the subject is beyond the pale of 
reasonable choice, and subject to being struck down as violating due process. 
  It goes without saying that the conception of the reasonable looks to the prevailing 
understanding of the broad society, not to individual notions that a judge may entertain 
for himself alone, and in applying a national constitution the society of reference is the 
nation.  On specific issues, widely shared understandings within the national society can 
change as interests claimed under the rubric of liberty evolve into recognition, or are 
recast in light of experience and accumulated knowledge. 
Id. at 2340-41. 
 250. See supra p. 541. 
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more modest efforts of Gregg and modern death penalty constitutional 
law, which followed and deferred more to state legislative action, failed, 
in Justice Blackmun’s view, to meet the constitutional objectives and 
obligations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.251  Likewise, 
the ALI abandoned its efforts to craft or revise a model death penalty 
statute because the system is not workable.252  If the ALI cannot craft a 
model statute, can the Court comfortably rely on state statutory action as 
the lead guide in Eighth Amendment death penalty limits? 
With respect to severely mentally ill defendants, a slow, 
incremental, cautious approach that counts states in order to discern the 
evolving standards of decency that guide the Eighth Amendment will 
undoubtedly mean that states will kill severely mentally ill prisoners 
while an exemption inches its way through legislatures across the 
country.  In other words, an individual, who is not sufficiently culpable 
to be punished by death when viewed in comparison with other 
protected groups, will be executed under the counting regime to which 
the Court adheres.  While it is undoubtedly critical for the Court to be 
sufficiently deferential to the democratic branches and the legislative 
process, there are limits to waiting for the states to act.  To risk stating 
the obvious, would relying on such an approach to constitutional 
construction have allowed a 1950s Supreme Court to bring a 
constitutional end to the entrenched segregationist practices of the Deep 
South?253 
Moreover, a rigid approach to counting states does not seem to be a 
particularly principled way to interpret such important constitutional 
protection.254  The pattern of Eighth Amendment cases suggests, if not 
expressly at least implicitly, that there must be eighteen death penalty 
states, or thirty death penalty and non-death penalty states combined, 
before a certain class of defendants is constitutionally protected from 
execution that would otherwise be disproportionate.255  This method 
seems an odd way for constitutional protection to evolve.  While perhaps 
connected to the consensus of the states, this aspect of discerning the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment does not appear particularly 
connected to the stated constitutional goal of tying the death penalty to 
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 254. Hills, Jr., supra note 132. 
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culpability.  Further, relying on state legislative action does not 
necessarily insulate the Court from public rebuke or attack when it 
interprets the Eighth Amendment.  For example, some of the public 
response to Roper, which focused on the reference in the opinion to the 
international community in the opinion, was quite strident in its criticism 
of the Court. 
Despite the criticisms and shortcomings of the “counting” method 
of constitutional construction, the reality is that counting is part of the 
game.  Thus, when advocates for the mentally ill marshal their 
arguments, they must deal with this aspect of capital punishment law.  
Acceptance of this aspect of the Eighth Amendment, however, does not 
mean that the advocates for severely mentally ill offenders must accept 
defeat.  For example, advocates could assert that in the last eight years, 
the Court has broadened the Eighth Amendment’s standard of decency 
by recognizing that the Eighth Amendment precludes the imposition of 
the death penalty on any individual who, due to a medically established 
mental condition, is less culpable or at least possesses no greater 
culpability than juveniles or mentally retarded offenders.  Looking at the 
Eighth Amendment from a broader principle of culpability that 
correlates to a defendant’s documented medical condition would provide 
an argument that the consensus already exists to protect the severely 
mentally ill whose culpability is no greater than that of the mentally 
retarded or juvenile offender.  In support of this argument, advocates can 
urge that even in the absence of eighteen death penalty states explicitly 
exempting the mentally ill from the death penalty, multiple state actions 
show a national consensus protecting the severely mentally ill:  (1) states 
giving effect to the constitutional prohibition on executing juveniles and 
mentally retarded offenders indicate state recognition that certain 
characteristics—that are also associated with severe mental illness—
must limit the death penalty; (2) statutes prohibiting the execution of 
“insane” prisoners illustrate the universal revulsion generated by 
executing individuals who lack a rational understanding of their 
circumstances; (3) statutes providing that mental illness is a mitigating 
factor demonstrate the strong societal view that mental illness is a reason 
not to impose the death penalty; (4) current trend of state statutory 
restrictions or prohibitions on the use of the death penalty is evidence of 
a general movement away from the death penalty; (5) in addition to 
Connecticut’s statutory exemption for the severely mentally ill, other 
state legislatures are in the process of crafting statutory protection for 
this group of capital offenders; (6) state justices have raised concerns 
about the execution of the mentally ill based on provisions in state 
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constitutions; and (7) the actions of the ABA and ALI demonstrate 
major legal organizations’ significant concerns about the continued use 
of the death penalty in general and as applied to mentally ill offenders. 
Although this argument may be appealing, in the end, it will 
probably not prevail.  Rather, it is very likely that the Court will look at 
the severely mentally ill as a category or class of offenders that is 
separate and distinct from juvenile or mentally retarded offenders and 
that is seeking a separate and unique exemption from the death penalty.  
If the Court deals with the severely mentally ill as falling within a new 
or wholly separate category of Eighth Amendment exemptions, then the 
Court may only be willing to count those statutes and legislative actions 
bearing directly on the mentally ill.  If the Court analyzes this exemption 
in isolation, then the precedents of Atkins and Roper may be probative, 
but not determinative, and the legislative record for this exemption at 
this time is probably not sufficient for the Court to find that a consensus 
exempting the severely mentally ill.  Instead, as discussed earlier, efforts 
to establish recognition for a death penalty exemption for the severely 
mentally ill will require the additional hard work of crafting specific 
state exemptions for the mentally ill, such as is currently underway in 
Indiana and North Carolina. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the Court’s past practices, including its holdings and 
analysis in Atkins and Roper, it seems likely that the Court will look at 
and demand separate state legislative exemptions explicitly protecting 
the severely mentally ill who, at the time of the commission of their 
crime, lacked the requisite culpability to have the death penalty imposed 
upon them.  Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in Gregg, the 
Court appears to avoid the use of broad protections and broad challenges 
to the death penalty.  Rather the Court inches forward, and often 
backward, on the constitutional scope of the death penalty in America on 
a case-by-case basis requiring states to take the lead on any systemic 
change to the modern death penalty regime.  My reluctant conclusion is 
that the Court is going to engage in an isolated, narrow approach to 
constitutional construction on this issue, and while Atkins and Roper 
may be useful, they will not be determinative.  Moreover, to look at this 
issue as only about the constitutional exemption and not about the 
process by which the constitutional exemption becomes a reality is to 
misread the Court.  Such an approach would underestimate the 
frustrating realities of modern death penalty jurisprudence and would 
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cause advocates to miss an essential component of a successful 
constitutional challenge. 
Thus, from a pragmatic—albeit disappointing—point of view, the 
future of the constitutional death penalty exemption for the severely 
mentally ill is as dependent on the state legislative process as it is on the 
Court.  While recognizing the compelling analogies between the 
severely mentally ill and other vulnerable groups exempt from the death 
penalty, as well as the influential positions of the ABA, the ALI and 
other professional organizations representing the mentally ill, at this 
point in time, the Court is going to look to state legislatures, and what 
happens in those legislative bodies, in my view, is likely to be 
determinative of the future of this exemption from the death penalty. 
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